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China’s rise and the strategic uncertainty about its future intentions have 
compelled countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia and Thailand, to adopt hedging 
strategies to deal with China’s rise. Since 2012, with China’s foreign policy shifting 
toward a more proactive and assertive policy posture, Indonesia and Thailand have 
exhibited divergent hedging responses: Indonesia has shifted toward the balancing end of 
the hedging spectrum while Thailand has shifted toward the bandwagoning end. 
This thesis seeks to analyze Indonesia’s and Thailand’s hedging responses and the 
key factors that explain their different hedging preferences. This thesis contends that 
Indonesia’s and Thailand’s hedging strategies have shifted in response to a change in 
their ruling elites’ perception of benefits from an improved relationship with China, vis-
à-vis their perception of China as a security threat. In both countries, domestic factors 
have also exerted an intervening effect on policy outcomes to different extents. 
Indonesia’s hedging strategy reflects the compromise between enhancing Indonesia’s 
future security, addressing nationalistic concerns of defending Indonesia’s sovereignty, 
and gaining economic benefits. On the other hand, Thailand’s ruling elites have sought to 
politically and economically benefit from China’s rise in order to bolster their political 
legitimacy at home. 
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One of the current debates in Southeast Asian security is centered on how 
Southeast Asian countries will strategically react to a rising China and the evolving 
regional security order. International relations scholars and foreign policy analysts have 
asserted that Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Thailand have not 
exhibited any hard-balancing or bandwagoning behaviors in the strictest sense; rather, 
they have adopted hedging strategies that pursue equidistant relations with the current 
hegemonic power, the United States, and China, as the rising great power. 
With the continued growth of China’s relative power and the United States’ 
relative decline, any perceived shifts in the regional order or perceived threats emanating 
from China’s rise would compel Indonesia and Thailand to reconsider their existing 
equidistant relationships with these two powers. A rational actor that views China’s rising 
power as less of a threat and more of an opportunity to increase economic and political 
gains would seek to align closer with China in its hedging strategy. On the other hand, an 
actor that is more concerned with the perceived threat of China’s rising power would 
prioritize its security concerns over economic and political benefits, with an inclination to 
align closer with the United States and its allied partners in the region. 
Since 2012, with China’s foreign policy shifting toward a more proactive and 
assertive policy posture, Indonesia and Thailand have exhibited divergent hedging 
responses. Indonesia has shifted towards the balancing end of the hedging spectrum 
because Indonesian political elites view China’s more assertive policy posture—
especially with regards to the South China Sea (SCS)—as an increasing security threat. In 
contrast, Thailand has shifted towards the bandwagoning end of the hedging spectrum 
because Thailand’s political elites view the perceived benefits associated with China’s 
proactive engagement and rising power as a means of bolstering their domestic 
legitimacy. The different strategic considerations that underlie Indonesia’s and Thailand’s 
responses to China’s policy shifts highlight how geopolitical and domestic political 
factors exert different pressures on Indonesia’s and Thailand’s hedging preferences. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis analyzes Indonesia’s and Thailand’s foreign policy responses toward 
China’s growing power, and the recent developments in China’s foreign policy under 
President Xi Jinping. Within the current hedging strategy adopted by Indonesia and 
Thailand, have these Southeast Asian states leaned closer toward bandwagoning with 
China for gains, maintained their current hedging strategies, or aligned with balancing 
against the risk of an increasing China threat in the economic, political, and security 
realms? What are the key variables that provide an explanation for Indonesia’s and 
Thailand’s differing responses within their hedging strategies? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The study of Indonesia’s and Thailand’s behaviors in response to China’s rise has 
two important implications. First, understanding the various competing factors that 
influence the strategic calculus of Southeast Asian states has implications for 
policymakers in understanding the strategies of small states in coping with systemic 
changes. Second, with the increasing competition between the United States and China 
for influence in Southeast Asia, it is important to understand how shifts in China’s 
foreign policy are affecting Southeast Asian states’ behavior. Understanding the causal 
logic of Southeast Asia’s strategies in response to China’s rise has wide-ranging 
implications for the United States as it seeks to strengthen its strategic alliances and build 
new regional partnerships to counter-balance China’s expanding sphere of influence in 
Southeast Asia. 
In studying the alignment behaviors of small states, the two Southeast Asian 
states—Indonesia and Thailand—are important case selections because they are strategic 
pivot states. These countries have established close relationships with both United States 
and China, and they have been successful in maintaining a neutral orientation in order to 
strategically benefit from both sides. However, hedging may not be a viable long-term 
strategy if Sino-American rivalry in the future forces these countries to choose sides. An 
analysis of these countries’ strategic preferences and shifts in policy postures in response 
to China’s current rise would provide significant indicators on the future trajectory of 
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their regional security alignments. It would also provide valuable insights into how the 
U.S. rebalancing policy within Southeast Asia could be better calibrated in order to 
regain lost ground in the strategic competition for influence with China. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following section first discusses three possible strategies of small states in 
dealing with China as a potential threat: balancing, bandwagoning, and engagement. The 
hedging strategy, which comprises elements of balancing, bandwagoning, and 
engagement, is also defined to understand the hedging strategies of Southeast Asian 
states. 
1. Strategies of States: Balancing, Bandwagoning, and Engagement 
Small and medium-sized states react to the rise of a great power through various 
strategies. From a neo-realist perspective, states can either balance against the strong or 
threatening state, or they can bandwagon with that power. Besides balancing and 
bandwagoning, states may also choose engagement as a policy option to convert a rising 
power with revisionist intentions into a status quo power. 
a. Balancing 
Under the concept of balancing, the implication of anarchy drives states to adopt 
balancing strategies to ensure their security and survival from stronger powers. States can 
internally balance by increasing their own military capabilities and externally balance by 
forming coalitions against the strong power. In some literature, the use of military power 
and alliance to prevent strong powers from conquering weaker states has been defined as 
hard-balancing.1 
Stephen Walt argues that the inclination of states to balance is not only in 
response to power, but it is also a response to perceived threats from that power. The 
perception of threat is based on four factors: aggregate power, offensive capability, 
proximity of power, and aggressive intention. Although aggregate power—defined by a 
                                                 
1 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010), 113–28. 
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state’s total resources—determines the potential capability of a state, offensive capability 
determines how threatening a military capability is perceived by other states. In addition, 
proximity also plays an important function in determining the degree of threat because it 
affects employment of power. Lastly, the inclination to balance depends on the perceived 
intent of the state: aggressive intentions increase the risk perception of threat and would 
provoke balancing, whereas policies that demonstrate restraint and benign intentions 
would negate balancing.2 
Other scholars have defined a more subtle form of balancing, which is known as 
soft-balancing. One version of soft-balancing involves the use of non-military 
instruments, which, according to Robert Pape, include political alignments, diplomacy, 
and economic strengthening.3 For example, soft-balancing has been used by Southeast 
Asian states that do not perceive China as an existential threat; hence, the intent of soft-
balancing is not to directly challenge China’s military power, but to restrict or impose 
costs on China if it misuses its military power. In contrast, another variant of soft-
balancing involves the use of another dominant power’s military instrument to balance 
against a perceived threat. Yuen Foong Khong describes Southeast Asia’s soft-balancing 
behavior as “balancing against a perceived potential threat” by encouraging the continued 
U.S. military presence in Asia without the “formation of formal military alliances.”4 
Similarly, Denny Roy describes such soft-balancing behaviors as “low-intensity 
balancing” where Southeast Asian states decline “to establish a formal military alliance” 
to counter a low-level present threat.5   
                                                 
2 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 
(1985): 3–43, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538540. 
3 Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 36, 
doi: 10.1162/0162288054894607. 
4 Yuen Foong Khong, “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing 
in Southeast Asia’s Post-Cold War Strategy,” in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and 
Efficiency, ed. J. J Suh, Peter Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford University Press, 2004), 174. 
5 Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 27, no. 2 (2005): 310, doi: 10.1353/csa.2011.0115. 
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b. Bandwagoning 
As for the concept of bandwagoning, there are several differences in literature 
over its definition and motivation. Walt describes bandwagoning as the opposite end of 
the balancing spectrum, where weaker states ally with the threatening state. He articulates 
that states choose bandwagoning as a means of appeasing the potential threat so that it 
will not be attacked. Because weak states in close proximity to strong and threatening 
powers do not have the means to balance, or alliances are neither viable nor effective to 
prevent it from being attacked, bandwagoning as a policy makes more sense.6 Therefore, 
small states in Southeast Asia, being at China’s periphery, would likely bandwagon if 
they do not have the assurance of an effective alliance to counterbalance against the 
threatening power. All things being equal, Walt argues that states facing an external 
threat would overwhelmingly prefer to adopt a balancing strategy rather than a 
bandwagoning policy. Because bandwagoning requires an acceptance of “subordination 
under a potential hegemon,” the subordinate state loses its “freedom of action” and relies 
on the continued benevolence of the potential hegemon.7  Balancing is seen as a safer 
strategy because there is no guarantee that a potential hegemon would not change its 
intentions. 
Unlike Walt, Randall Schweller describes bandwagoning and balancing as 
separate strategies, rather than two opposing forms of reaction to the perception of threat. 
If the goal of the state is self-preservation, then it is more likely to adopt a balancing 
strategy. On the other hand, a state that is interested in profits would bandwagon instead. 
Since bandwagoning is adopted in the expectation of gains, and balancing exacts high 
costs, Southeast Asian states would rather bandwagon with China if it is not perceived as 
an imminent threat to their survival. Opportunistic Southeast Asian states would also 
bandwagon with a revisionist China if it is perceived as the winning side.8 
                                                 
6 Walt, “Alliance Formation,” 15–18. 
7 Ibid., 15. 
8 Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International 
Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72–107, doi: 10.2307/2539149. 
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c. Engagement 
Besides balancing and bandwagoning, political analysts have also advocated that 
states do adopt an engagement policy option in response to rising powers. Schweller 
describes the policy of engagement as “the use of non-coercive means to ameliorate the 
non-status quo elements of a rising major power’s behavior. The goal is to ensure that 
this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional 
and global order.”9 The intent is to minimize conflict while appeasing and 
accommodating the rise of the great power within the current regional and international 
order. 
The engagement strategy has been viewed from two perspectives by Southeast 
Asian states: The first perspective views engagement as a neoliberal and constructivist 
approach in which Southeast Asian states engage China at the bilateral level and through 
regional institutions such as ASEAN. The intent of this strategy is to develop economic, 
diplomatic, and military ties that facilitate China’s integration into the regional order and 
socialize China with ASEAN norms such as the respect of sovereignty and peaceful 
settlement of disputes. In the process, engagement would also regulate China’s behavior 
and reduce the probability that China would revise the regional order through conflict.10 
The second perspective views engagement as a complementary strategy to balancing. 
Through engagement, Southeast Asian states seek to gain a better understanding of 
China’s future intentions, so that they could attempt to address China’s dissatisfactions 
and to socialize China toward a status quo power. Concurrently, an engagement strategy 
serves to buy time for Southeast Asian states to strengthen their balancing options in the 
event that China cannot be appeased and threatens to challenge the regional order.11 
                                                 
9 Randall Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Engaging China: 
The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (London, NY: 
Routledge, 1999), 14. 
10 Roy, “Southeast Asia and China,” 305–22.  
11 Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers,” 14–16. 
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2. Strategies of States: Hedging 
Hedging has been described as a mixed—and often complex—strategy that 
combines the balancing, bandwagoning, and engagement approaches in response to the 
strategic uncertainties of China’s rise and the evolving regional order. Khong prefers to 
describe the hedging strategies of Southeast Asian states as soft-balancing with 
engagement; others have explained the policies as a mix of balancing and bandwagoning 
strategies, as opposed to hedging.12 In contrast, Amitav Acharya avoids using the 
balancing and bandwagoning terms to describe ASEAN states’ behaviors. Instead, he 
sees ASEAN states as seeking to accommodate and engage China while “dealing with the 
security challenge of China through a mix of deterrence and cooperative security 
approach.”13 
The incentive to hedge is seen to be most prevalent in a unipolar system that is “in 
the process of power deconcentration.”14 In such an international system, Brock Tessman 
argues that “strategic hedging behavior helps second-tiered states cope with the threats 
and constraints they are likely to encounter under conditions of unipolarity, while 
simultaneously preparing them for new threats and opportunities that are likely to emerge 
as the system leader falls further into decline.”15 For Southeast Asian states that view the 
United States as a security guarantor in the region, strategic hedging is a policy means to 
cope with the potential loss of “security-related public goods” provided by the current 
hegemon, while protecting themselves against a rising and threatening regional power.16 
Regardless of the differing nuances of the hedging concepts in current literature, 
Southeast Asia analysts agree that hedging has been the core strategy adopted by many 
                                                 
12Khong, “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty,” 172–208; Roy, “Southeast Asia and China,” 305–22; 
Ann Marie Murphy, “Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning: Thailand’s Response to China’s Rise,” Asian 
Security  6, no. 1 (2010): 1–27, doi: 10.1080/14799850903471922. 
13 Amitav Acharya, “Seeking Security in the Dragon’s Shadow: China and Southeast Asia in the 
Emerging Asian Order,” RSIS Working Paper 44 (March 2003): 23, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP44.pdf. 
14 Brock F. Tessman, “System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu,” Security 
Studies 21, no. 2 (2012): 193, doi: 10.1080/09636412.2012.679203. 
15 Ibid., 203. 
16 Ibid., 205.  
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Southeast Asian states in the current geopolitical context.17 In order to cope with the 
strategic uncertainty of China’s rise, the broad concept of the hedging strategy consists of 
engagement with China while balancing against potential Chinese aggression through 
maintaining a security relationship with the United States and other major powers in the 
region. Through the employment of hedging as a core strategy, Southeast Asian states 
aim to minimize long-term threats while maximizing short-term opportunities that are 
associated with China’s rise. From the hedging state’s perspective, such a strategy also 
enables greater policy maneuvering space and the flexibility to align with the perceived 
winning side in the event of a great power rivalry in the region. 
a. Defining the Hedging Strategy: A Conceptual Framework 
Two variations of the hedging strategy stand out within the vast amounts of 
literatures that study Southeast Asia’s hedging behavior. The first variant views hedging 
as a distinct form of strategy, rather than a strategy that sits in-between the balancing-
bandwagoning dichotomy. According to Evelyn Goh, “hedging may be defined as a set 
of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which 
states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, 
bandwagoning, or neutrality.”18 This hedging strategy comprises three elements: indirect 
or soft-balancing; complex engagement at the political, economic, and strategic levels; 
and enmeshment of major powers in the region to ensure a stable regional order.19 Goh 
argues that hedging occurs only when a state is able to pursue engagement policies 
concurrently with indirect or soft-balancing policies, so that the state can “cultivate a 
middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense 
                                                 
17 Analysts such as Evelyn Goh and Cheng-Chwee Kuik have been strong advocates of the hedging 
strategy to describe Southeast Asian states’ behaviors. For examples, see Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and 
Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, 
no. 3 (2007/08): 113–57, doi: 10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.113; Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asian Perspectives on 
the China Challenge,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, nos. 4–5 (2007): 809–32, doi: 
10.1080/01402390701431915; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Nor Azizan Idris, and Abd Rahim Md Nor, “The China 
Factor in the U.S. ‘Reengagement’ with Southeast Asia: Drivers and Limits of Converged Hedging,” Asian 
Politics and Policy 4, no. 3 (2012): 315–44, doi: 10.111/j.1943-0787.2012.01361.x. 
18 Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge,” 2. 
19 Ibid., 3–4. 
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of another.”20 Hedging is regarded as a distinct strategy because the aim is to preserve 
the “regional equilibrium based on the predominance of U.S. power.” When compared to 
the balancing or bandwagoning strategies, Goh asserts that their objectives differ because 
these strategies “aimed either at preventing a power transition or at achieving revisionist 
results within the power distribution.”21 
Conceptually, the definition of hedging as a distinct strategy outside the 
balancing-bandwagoning spectrum is problematic. While Goh was careful to make the 
distinction that bandwagoning is a policy of alignment (and should not be misconstrued 
as engagement), her defined elements of indirect balancing, engagement, and 
enmeshment have clear connotations of either balancing against a potential China threat 
or bandwagoning for profit with China. In addition, small states do not have the power to 
preserve the status quo when a rising power such as China is challenging the U.S. 
hegemony in the region. Instead, small states protect their interests by cultivating ties 
with both sides without having to make an explicit choice of pure-balancing or pure-
bandwagoning—for as long as the systemic conditions allow. 
Another problem with labelling hedging as a distinct strategy outside the 
balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy is the difficulty of measuring shifts in hedging 
behaviors. In her argument, Goh attempts to operationalize the hedging strategy of 
Southeast Asian states in relation to the United States and China. She describes a strong 
hedger state as one that maintains a neutral position without leaning to either side, while a 
weak hedger is perceived as a state with the tendency to lean toward one side. This 
definition of hedging may be useful to describe the hedging behaviors of Southeast Asian 
states, but it is not useful as an analytical tool to understand shifts in behavior. 
The second variant of the hedging definition sees hedging behavior as a strategy 
that falls in-between the balancing-bandwagoning spectrum. According to Cheng-Chwee 
Kuik, such a policy spectrum reflects the “degree of rejection and acceptance on the part 
of the smaller states towards a Great Power, with pure-balancing representing the highest 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 35. 
 10 
degree of power rejection, and pure-bandwagoning the extreme form of power 
acceptance.”22 As opposed to Goh who defines hedging as a middle position, Kuik 
defines hedging as opposite or contradictory positions aimed at protecting a state’s 
interest through profit-maximizing while concurrently mitigating the longer-term risk of a 
potential threat.23 
Under Kuik’s multi-component hedging framework, a hedging strategy involves 
the implementation of “two sets of mutually counteracting policy instruments that can be 
labelled the ‘returns-maximizing’ and ‘risk-contingency’ options.”24 Hedging is therefore 
a two-pronged approach: On the one hand, a hedging state aims to increase economic, 
diplomatic, and political gains by building a constructive relationship with the rising 
power through returns-maximizing policies.25 On the other hand, the risk-contingency 
policy aims to mitigate the potential threats of a rising power and to “reduce the hedger’s 
loss if things go awry.”26 Under this two-pronged approach, Kuik suggests that the five 
specific policy tools—economic-pragmatism, binding-engagement, limited-
bandwagoning, dominance-denial, and indirect-balancing—are common across all 
Southeast Asian states that employ hedging vis-à-vis China. 
Compared to Goh’s definition of hedging, there are several advantages of using 
Kuik’s conceptual framework for analyzing shifts in policy posture. The simplification of 
policies into risk-contingency and returns-maximizing options provides a useful 
analytical tool to measure the subtle shifts in strategic behavior. Because hedging 
behavior is seen as a spectrum of strategies between the pure balancing-bandwagoning 
dichotomy, and not as a distinct strategy, it is easier to determine whether a state’s 
hedging strategy is leaning toward risk-contingency options because it perceives China as 
                                                 
22 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising 
China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 30, no. 2 (2008): 
165, doi: 10.1353/csa.0.0023. 
23 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Making Sense of Malaysia’s China Policy: Asymmetry, Proximity, and 
Elite’s Domestic Authority,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 6 (2013): 434–35, doi: 
10.1093/cjip/pot006. 
24 Ibid., 435. 
25 Kuik, “Essence of Hedging,” 163–71. 
26 Ibid., 171. 
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an increasing threat or toward returns-maximizing options because it wants to maximize 
its gain with the rising, revisionist power. 
b. Conditions and Variables that Influence the Hedging Strategy 
The conditions for Southeast Asian states to adopt hedging behaviors depend on a 
number of factors. According to Kuik, the hedging strategy is only possible when three 
conditions are met. First, there must not be any imminent existential threat to Southeast 
Asian states. Second, there should not be any existence of ideological fault lines (such as 
the Cold War) that force these states to form alliances. Lastly, there must not be any 
scenario that forces these small states to choose sides, such as great power rivalries in the 
region. The existence of any of the three conditions would likely compel a small state to 
shift from hedging to a pure balancing or pure bandwagoning strategy to ensure its own 
survival.27  
Scholars have also examined variables that determine Southeast Asian states’ 
hedging policies toward China. Ian Chen and Alan Yang argue that a state’s policy 
response toward China can be narrowed down to the interaction between two variables: 
threat perception and the expectation of economic relations. A state that associates 
China’s rise as an increasing threat with negative economic benefits would orientate 
toward soft-balancing behaviors. On the other hand, if a state perceives a low threat 
perception and a positive economic relationship, it would orientate toward bandwagoning 
behaviors.28 This logic similarly holds true for a state adopting the hedging strategy; 
whether a state’s hedging preference would orientate toward soft-balancing or 
bandwagoning would depend on the degree of threat perception vis-à-vis the expectations 
of economic benefits. 
In the current geopolitical context, Indonesia and Thailand have adopted a 
hedging strategy because they do not perceive China as an imminent threat. Instead, they 
broadly view China’s rise as a challenge fraught with strategic uncertainties, or they view 
                                                 
27 Kuik, “Essence of Hedging,” 165.  
28 Ian Tsung-Yen Chen and Alan Hao Yang, “A Harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory Typologies 
to ASEAN Countries’ Strategies to the Rise of China,” The Pacific Review 26, no. 3 (2013): 265–88, doi: 
10.1080/09512748.2012.759260. 
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China as a potential long-term threat. Nevertheless, each state has pursued different 
policy options under the hedging strategy, depending on their perception of China’s 
growing power in relation to their common interests. An increasingly assertive China 
policy may raise Southeast Asia’s fear of China’s growing power, which would 
encourage states to lean toward stronger balancing policies. On the other hand, states that 
perceive greater benefits from closer economic ties with China may prefer to step up their 
level of engagement with China rather than lean toward balancing so as not to jeopardize 
the mutually beneficial relationship.  
Domestic politics may also play an important role in the equilibrium. Kuik views 
domestic politics as an “intervening variable between structural conditions and states’ 
policy choices.”29 In the case study of Malaysia, Kuik concluded that structural changes 
such as the changing distribution of power in the form of China’s growing power should 
have encouraged greater balancing policies. Instead, Malaysia adopted a hedging 
approach that prioritized “immediate economic and diplomatic benefits over potential 
security concerns, while simultaneously attempting to keep its strategic options open for 
as long as the systemic conditions allow.”30 Therefore, without considering the possible 
intervening role of domestic politics, hedging behaviors in response to structural changes 
may not have a causal logic on their own. 
D. HYPOTHESES 
This thesis examines two key factors that affect the decision-making of political 
elites in Indonesia and Thailand: the perception of a security threat and the expectation of 
economic and political gains. From a threat perspective, China’s rising powers and 
increasingly revisionist behaviors would compel a state to balance against the China 
threat. From a potential gains perspective, the intervening role of domestic politics would 
shape the priorities of political leaders in pursuing greater engagement and 
accommodation to maximize the potential gains associated with China’s rise. Therefore, 
                                                 
29 Kuik, “Essence of Hedging,” 165. 
30 Kuik, “Making Sense of Malaysia’s China Policy,” 437. 
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the net effect of policies is seen as a form of equilibrium between perceived threats and 
potential gains. 
Based on this insight, this thesis seeks to investigate two potential hypotheses to 
explain the different hedging responses of Indonesia and Thailand. The first hypothesis 
views China’s increasing material capabilities as the driving factor for a state to prioritize 
its risk-contingency options over its returns-maximizing options to deal with an 
increasing threat. Therefore, Indonesia and Thailand would be compelled to adopt a 
hedging position that leans toward balancing as China’s power continues to grow while 
concurrently pursuing pragmatic policies to maximize economic gains. 
The second hypothesis draws on Kuik’s explanation that a state’s policy is not 
purely determined by the growth or threat of China’s power; rather, it is a “function of 
regime legitimation through which the ruling elite seek to capitalize on the dynamics of 
the rising power” for their own political survival.31 According to Kuik, ruling elites make 
policy choices “to justify their domination by acting in accordance with the very 
foundations of their authority at a given time”; such foundations could refer to the ruling 
elites’ ability “to preserve security and internal cohesion, to deliver economic growth, to 
uphold sovereignty and to promote a rationalized ideal that is peculiar to a particular 
country.”32 According to this hypothesis, the Indonesian and Thai ruling elites would 
assess the implications of China’s rise and make policy choices that would best legitimize 
their political authority at home. 
E. RESEARCH METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines the changes in China’s foreign policy between President Hu 
Jintao (2002–2011) and Xi Jinping (2012-present). The thesis then describes and explains 
changes in foreign policy orientations of Indonesia and Thailand in response to China’s 
foreign policy changes. In each case study, the individual state’s relationship with China 
during the period of 2002–2011 is analyzed to determine whether there were any strategic 
preferences in hedging, so that shifts in policy posture from 2012 may be identified in 
                                                 
31 Kuik, “Essence of Hedging,” 159. 
32 Ibid., 162. 
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tandem with the recent developments in China’s foreign policy. The analysis of trends 
and behaviors is based on secondary sources such as scholarly articles, press reporting, 
and official government statements from the countries in the case studies. 
This thesis adopts Kuik’s hedging definition, which views hedging as a strategy 
that fits in between the pure balancing-bandwagoning continuum. It also views hedging 
as the concurrent implementation of “two sets of mutually counteracting policy 
instruments” that serve to increase gains and mitigate risks.33 However, this thesis differs 
from Kuik’s characterization that the five specific policy tools of a hedging strategy are 
always the same for all states. Instead, this thesis views hedging as the employment of a 
broad range of policy tools that could vary between countries. The implementation of 
specific tools in a hedging strategy would depend on the specific context and how each 
country perceives its position along the balancing-bandwagoning continuum. The 
adoption of such a broader hedging framework would help account for the differences in 
hedging behaviors across the Southeast Asian states. The types of policy tools are 
analyzed to determine the different emphases of hedging in the respective Indonesia-
China and Thailand-China relationships. By examining the progression of each 
component in the hedging strategy, a general trend concerning alignment can be 
identified. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains five chapters with the thesis study divided into two main 
parts. The first part of the thesis study, comprising Chapter II, provides a synopsis of the 
recent developments of China’s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. It also examines 
the significant shifts in foreign policy after the leadership transition from President Hu to 
President Xi. This part is essential to provide the context for assessing the perceived 
China threat vis-à-vis the expectations of potential gains.  
The second part, composed of Chapters III and IV, analyzes and explains the 
different policy responses of Indonesia and Thailand toward China’s rise and Beijing’s 
recent shift in foreign policy under President Xi. Chapter III examines how Indonesia has 
                                                 
33 Kuik, “Making Sense of Malaysia’s China Policy,” 435. 
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responded to China’s policy shifts by orientating towards the balancing end of the 
hedging spectrum while Chapter IV examines how Thailand has shifted towards the 
bandwagoning end of the hedging spectrum. In both chapters, empirical evidence is 
organized along two timelines: the 2001–2011 period and 2012 onwards. These timelines 
match two different eras in China’s foreign policy. Observed trends in both periods are 
used to determine the shifts in Indonesian and Thai policies along the hedging spectrum 
in response to changes in China’s policy toward Southeast Asia. 
Chapter V summarizes the geopolitical and domestic political factors that have 
determined the different hedging responses of Indonesia and Thailand toward China’s 
rising power and its new course of policy engagement in Southeast Asia. It concludes that 
domestic factors have been the key intervening variables that have determined the policy 
outcome in both countries; ruling elites in both countries have made policy choices that 
would best legitimize their political authority at home. This chapter ends with key 
insights into how the United States can adjust its rebalancing strategy to counterbalance 
China’s growing influence and to be a more effective strategic partner in the region.   
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II. CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFTS 
Before addressing how Indonesia and Thailand have responded to China’s recent 
foreign policy and behaviors, an examination of China’s foreign policy under President 
Hu Jintao’s and President Xi Jinping’s administration is required to determine whether 
there have been any fundamental changes to China’s policy toward Southeast Asia. This 
chapter argues that China’s foreign policy under Xi’s leadership has shown both 
continuity and change. Xi’s government has continued to adhere to the peaceful 
development policy introduced by President Hu’s administration, which has been 
essential in maintaining a stable periphery necessary for China’s domestic development. 
Concurrently, China’s policy has also shifted in four key ways: First, Xi’s government 
has elevated neighborhood diplomacy as a top priority. Second, China has adopted a 
more proactive approach in shaping the regional environment. Third, Beijing has 
demonstrated a forceful determination to protect China’s national interests. Fourth, China 
has sought to develop strategic relations based on reciprocity where neighboring 
countries that seek to cooperate with China will be rewarded in kind, but provocative 
neighbors that seek to challenge China’s national interests will be met with 
aggressiveness. These policy shifts indicate that Xi’s government has moved toward a 
more proactive approach in shaping the regional environment to facilitate China’s 
peaceful development while assertively safeguarding its national interests. 
Although Xi’s foreign policy initiatives have generated greater opportunities for 
strategic cooperation and produced greater benefits for Southeast Asian states, these 
positive outcomes have been undermined by China’s aggressive actions in the South 
China Sea (SCS) disputes. Compared to the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
most—if not all—Southeast Asian states have perceived China’s actions in the SCS as an 
increasing security threat, but only some states have adjusted their policy toward greater 
balancing in response to an increasingly assertive China. The varied responses from these 
states suggest that policy adjustments toward China would depend on a state’s 
prioritization of benefits from a closer relation with China vis-à-vis the perceived need to 
deal with a stronger China threat. 
 18 
This chapter, which proceeds in three parts, examines the shifts in China’s foreign 
policy and its implications to Southeast Asia. The first part introduces China’s peaceful 
development policy under Hu’s leadership (2002–2011) and examines China’s key 
engagement policies to reassure Southeast Asia of China’s peaceful rise. The second part 
highlights the perceived changes in China’s behaviors toward Southeast Asia since 2012 
and identifies the key shifts in China’s policy that have accounted for these changes. The 
third part examines the implications of Xi’s foreign policy shifts to the policy outcomes 
of Southeast Asian states and relates them to the various responses that have already 
occurred since 2013. 
A. HU’S FOREIGN POLICY: CONCEPT OF PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT  
A key Chinese foreign policy emphasized under Hu’s administration was the 
promotion of the “peaceful development” or “peaceful rise” concept.34 Under Hu’s 
leadership, Beijing placed a strong emphasis on developing a positive relationship with 
Southeast Asian states to ensure China’s peaceful development while adhering to Deng 
Xiaoping’s exhortation of “Keeping a Low Profile” in its external relations.35 In his 
keynote address to the Boao Forum of Asia (BFA) in 2004, Hu advocated that China 
would “follow a peaceful development path holding high the banners of peace, 
development, and cooperation, joining the other Asian countries in bringing about Asian 
rejuvenation, and making a greater contribution to the lofty cause of peace and 
development in the world.”36 
Chinese leaders advocated several principles behind the peaceful development 
concept: China would “engage in regional cooperation in order to jointly create a 
peaceful, stable regional environment”; China’s peaceful development is based on 
                                                 
34 The “peaceful rise” theory eventually evolved into the “peaceful development” theory, which was 
deemed a more suitable phrase to portray China’s grand strategy and foreign policy. See Bonnie S. Glaser 
and Evan S Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and 
Demise of the Theory of ‘Peaceful Rise,’” The China Quarterly 190 (2007): 291–310, doi: 
10.1017/S0305741007001208. 
35 Xuetong Yan, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” The China Journal of 
International Politics (2014): 153–84, doi: 10.1093/cjip/pou027. 
36 Hu Jintao, “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Speech at BFA Annual Conference 2004,” Xinhua, April 24, 
2004, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/93897.htm. 
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“equality, mutual trust, and win-win cooperation”; China would build “good-neighboring 
relationships and partnership” with all countries based on the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence; and China’s national defense policy is “defensive in nature,” and it would 
never seek “hegemony or engage in expansion.”37 These principles contributed to the 
strategic objective of ensuring a stable external environment for China to focus on its 
domestic development. 
In order to achieve the goals of peaceful development, Hu’s policy toward 
Southeast Asia focused on enhancing engagement and mutually beneficial cooperation 
while reassuring Southeast Asian states that China’s rise presented an opportunity rather 
than a threat. In particular, Beijing pursued four key engagement policies in Southeast 
Asia: (1) expansion of China’s engagement in ASEAN institutions; (2) establishment of 
strategic partnerships and close bilateral relations; (3) expansion of regional economic 
cooperation; and (4) sustained diplomacy of reassurance to reduce strategic concerns of 
China’s rise.38 
(1) Expansion of China’s Engagement in ASEAN Institutions 
China began participating in ASEAN institutions in the mid-1990s and under 
Hu’s leadership China expanded and strengthened China-ASEAN engagements in three 
ways. First, China signed a slew of key agreements with ASEAN that signaled China’s 
commitments toward enhancing China-ASEAN cooperation and maintaining a peaceful 
rise.39 At the 2002 ASEAN Summit, China and ASEAN signed two key agreements: the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the Framework 
                                                 
37 See Hu Jintao, “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress,” Xinhua, October 24, 2007, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749_10.htm; Hu Jintao, “Full Text of Hu 
Jintao’s Speech at BFA Annual Conference 2004,” Xinhua, April 24, 2004, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/93897.htm; Wen Jiabao, “Full Text of Premier Wen Jiabao’s 
Speech at China-ASEAN Summit,” October 31, 2006, http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t278097.htm; 
“Premier Wen Attends ASEAN Plus Three Summit, Makes 5-Point Proposal,” Xinhua, November 20, 
2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/20/content_7116428.htm. 
38 Framework for analyzing China’s engagement policies adapted from Shambaugh’s article. See 
David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no. 3 
(2004/05): 72–89, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288043467496. 
39 Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asia Responses to China’s Rise: Managing the ‘Elephants?’” in The Rise of 
China and International Security: America and Asia Respond, ed. Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 162. 
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Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, which set the framework for 
establishing the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). At the 2003 ASEAN 
Summit, China acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and signed the 
Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity to enhance 
comprehensive cooperation “focusing on politics, economy, social affairs, security, and 
international and regional affairs.”40 
Second, China took an active—yet low-profile—role in supporting and 
establishing new ASEAN frameworks for regional cooperation. As the first non-ASEAN 
country to sign the TAC and establish an FTA with ASEAN, China actively supported 
the establishment of closer China-ASEAN ties. In advocating new frameworks for 
regional cooperation, Premier Wen proposed an initiative in 2004 to establish an East 
Asian Community to further strengthen regional cooperation. Subsequently, China 
supported Malaysia’s initiative of an exclusive East Asian grouping, which eventually 
became the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005. Nonetheless, although Beijing expanded 
its engagements in ASEAN, it avoided dominating these forums and preferred that 
ASEAN states take the lead. For instance, China supported Malaysia’s EAS initiative 
instead of pushing for its own grouping, and although China preferred an Asian exclusive 
EAS, it deferred to ASEAN’s decision to allow the United States to join the EAS in 
2010.41 
Third, China demonstrated an increasing willingness to engage in security 
cooperation since the early 2000s. Within the ASEAN-Plus-Three (APT) forum, China 
agreed to expand the dialogue from economic to political and security issues. China has 
also actively participated in security-related ASEAN institutions such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), where Beijing proposed initiatives such as the Security Policy 
Conference and hosted the first conference in 2004.42 China’s increased engagement in 
                                                 
40 ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and 
Prosperity,” External Relations-China, ASEAN website, accessed July 11, 2015, http://www.asean.org. 
41 For a discourse on the EAS, see Goh, “Southeast Asia Responses,” 162–63. 
42 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 87–88. 
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regional security was seen as an attempt to shape and influence the regional security 
environment in East Asia. 
By engaging Southeast Asian states within ASEAN institutions, Beijing reassured 
them of China’s peaceful development path. China’s active engagement in ASEAN 
institutions was also instrumental in expanding China’s influence via regional 
cooperation. Although scholars have debated the extent of China’s influence in Southeast 
Asia, there is no question that Southeast Asian states have to constantly take China’s 
interests into consideration due to the extensive Sino-ASEAN cooperation in the 
region.43 
(2) Establishment of Strategic Partnerships and Close Bilateral Relations  
As part of China’s diplomatic efforts to engage its neighbors, China has sought to 
establish strategic partnerships with Southeast Asian states (see Table 1). These 
agreements are part of Beijing’s initiatives to forge closer bilateral relations, foster 
mutually beneficial, multi-layered cooperation, and promote common interests while 
working to resolve differences. Furthermore, through these strategic partnerships, China 
has established bilateral mechanisms for frequent high-level political dialogues and visits 
with the Southeast Asian states. According to Michael Glosny, through these dialogues 
and visits, “China has shown that it is willing to invest the time, effort, and resources 
towards improving relations with the ASEAN countries.”44 Therefore, strategic 
partnerships serve as an important policy instrument to ensure a stable regional 
environment that would facilitate China’s continued focus on domestic development.45 
 
                                                 
43 For a more detailed discourse of how China has addressed political concerns through multilateral 
institutions, see Michael Glosny, “Heading toward a Win-Win Future? Recent Developments in China’s 
Policy toward Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 2, no. 1 (2007): 32–34, doi: 10.1080/14799850600575199. 
44 Michael Glosny, “Heading Toward a Win-Win Future?” 26. 
45 Ibid., 34. 
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Table 1.   China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy with Southeast Asia.46 
Countries Information on Strategic Partnerships 
ASEAN 2003 Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity 
Indonesia 2005 Strategic Partnership; 2013 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
Cambodia 2006 Comprehensive Partnership; 2010 Strategic Partnership 
Thailand 2007 Joint Action Plan for Strategic Cooperation; 2012 Comprehensive Strategic 
Cooperative Partnership 
Vietnam 2008 Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership 
Philippines 2009 Joint Action Plan for Strategic Cooperation 
Laos 2009 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation 
Malaysia 2009 Action Plan of Strategic Cooperative Partnership; 2013 Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership 
Myanmar 2011 Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership 
 
(3) Expansion of Regional Economic Cooperation 
China’s foreign policy has always placed a strong emphasis on expanding 
mutually beneficial economic cooperation. China’s growing economic cooperation with 
ASEAN has resulted in both sides benefiting from increasing bilateral trade (see Table 2). 
China-ASEAN trade has grown from $59 billion in 2003 to $280 billion in 2011. As of 
2011, China has become the top trading partner of ASEAN, and it is also one of the top 
three trading partners of ASEAN member states (with the exception of Brunei).  
Table 2.   China-ASEAN Trade Statistics 2003–2011 (US$ billion).47 
                                                 
46 Zhongping Feng and Jing Huang, “China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Engaging with a 
Changing World,” ESPO Working Paper no. 9 (2014): 19, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/WP-ESPO-8-JUNE-2014.pdf; Chenyang Li, “China-Myanmar Comprehensive 
Strategic Cooperative Partnership: A Regional Threat?” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 
1 (2012): 53–72, http://www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org. 
47 Data from ASEAN trade statistics database, http://www.asean.org/resources/2012-02-10-08-47-
55/statistical-publications. 
China-ASEAN 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
China (excluding HK) 59.6 89.1 113.4 139.9 171.1 196.9 178.2 232.0 280.4 
Total ASEAN Trade (%) 7.2 8.3 9.3 10.0 10.6 10.4 11.6 11.4 11.7 
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The expansion of regional economic cooperation has also included infrastructure 
developments—such as hydroelectric facilities and transportation networks—throughout 
Southeast Asia, especially for the countries that share common borders with China. Sutter 
argues that the Chinese and Southeast Asian governments have welcomed these 
developments because they have opened previously “inaccessible areas to greater 
economic development.”48 In addition, infrastructure developments facilitate the access 
and integration of nearby Southeast Asian markets with China’s economy, thereby 
expanding cross-border trades. 
From the perspective of economic, trade, and investment cooperation, the most 
important initiative has been the CAFTA. China signed the framework agreement in 
2002, which proposed an early harvest program provision and the progressive 
implementation of the CAFTA. According to Goh, the full implementation of the 
CAFTA by 2015 would make it the region’s largest free trade area, “comprising 1.7 
billion people, a total GDP of $2 trillion, and total trade exceeding $1.2 trillion.”49 By 
integrating the China-ASEAN economy through the CAFTA, Beijing hopes that ASEAN 
states would view their economic prosperity as increasingly linked to China’s growing 
economy. In turn, increasing economic interdependence provided Southeast Asian states 
with greater reassurance that China would continue its peaceful development path. 
(4) Sustained Diplomacy of Reassurance to Reduce Strategic Concerns of 
China’s Rise 
In Southeast Asia, strategic concerns with regard to China’s growing economic 
and military powers have revolved around three key issues. First, Southeast Asian states 
have viewed China’s rise as an economic challenge. Southeast Asia’s main concerns have 
been centered on the competition for foreign direct investment (FDI), market rivalry from 
China’s low-cost manufacturers, restrictive access to China’s market, and the flood of 
low-cost Chinese goods with the implementation of the FTA.50 Second, China’s growing 
                                                 
48 Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, 3rd ed. (Lanham, 
MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2012), 217. 
49 Goh, “Southeast Asia Responses,” 165. 
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military capabilities have raised concerns of China as a potential military threat. In the 
past two decades, China’s double-digit growth in defense spending has resulted in the 
People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) military capabilities growing more rapidly than its 
regional neighbors.51 In particular, Southeast Asian states have been wary of Beijing’s 
intentions to modernize the PLA’s force projection capabilities in combination with 
further increases in defense spending. Third, Beijing’s assertive posture in the SCS 
disputes has raised fears of China’s revisionist intentions. Evidence of assertiveness 
included provocative actions to force foreign vessels to leave contested waters, increased 
presence of Chinese naval patrols, enforcement of Chinese imposed fishing ban, and 
harsh diplomatic actions in response to perceived challenges from other claimant states.52  
Given that China’s approach toward building a stable and peaceful regional 
periphery hinges on efforts to counter the China threat syndrome, Beijing sustained its 
charm diplomacy to alleviate distrust and concerns regarding China’s rising powers and 
future intentions. At the regional level, China signed the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and 
Neutrality in 2001, consented to the terms of the DOC in 2002, and acceded to the TAC 
in 2003. Beijing’s commitment to these ASEAN agreements made it more believable that 
China would adhere to a peaceful rise, thereby reducing the strategic mistrust between 
China and Southeast Asian states in the early 2000s.53  
In an effort to alleviate concerns of China as an economic challenge, Beijing has 
sought to accommodate Southeast Asia’s interests. In the case of the CAFTA, Beeson 
and Li argue that “Chinese policymakers were prepared to accept relatively 
disadvantageous terms and hold out the prospect of an ‘early harvest’ of economic 
benefits in order to win over Southeast Asian states that remained concerned about the 
                                                 
51 “At the Double,” The Economist, March 15, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21599046-chinas-fast-growing-defence-budget-worries-its-
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52 Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior—Part Two: The Maritime 
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leadership-monitor/article/93591; See also a brief summary in Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, 227. 
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potential threat posed by a more powerful partner.”54 China also accommodated their 
interests of gaining access to important sectors of the Chinese economy by signing an 
agreement with ASEAN in 2007 to open up key service sectors.55 With regard to 
investments, China has offset concerns of competition for foreign investments by 
increasing its FDI to Southeast Asian countries—Chinese FDI has increased from less 
than $1 billion (between 2003 and 2005) to almost $8 billion in 2011 alone.56 Beijing’s 
accommodative policy and financial support have repeatedly earned goodwill with its 
neighbors.  
In order to address the fears of China’s growing military capabilities, defense 
diplomacy has become an important feature in China’s policy toward Southeast Asia, 
which Beijing has promoted through four ways. First, at the ASEAN level, China has 
sought to increase its participation in defense and security dialogues. Second, China has 
sought to improve military transparency through the biannual publication of China’s 
Defense White Paper. Third, China has facilitated regular military engagements with 
Southeast Asian states through the conduct of joint military and training exercises, 
bilateral defense dialogues, and high-level military exchanges. Fourth, Chinese military 
forces have participated in various humanitarian and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 
missions abroad in order to improve China’s international image. Based on the 2010 
Defense White Paper, the PLA has held forty-four joint military and training exercises 
with foreign troops, participated in nineteen UN peacekeeping missions, and established 
defense and security consultation and dialogue with twenty-two countries (including 
Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore).57 Through these various 
means, China’s defense diplomacy has served to project China’s military as a defensive 
capability, enhance mutual trust in defense relations, and assuage concerns of China’s 
rise. 
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With regard to the SCS disputes, Hu’s administration has generally adopted a 
moderate approach in order to avoid escalating tensions in the disputes. Beijing’s stance 
has been to shelve aside sovereignty disputes and focus instead on mutually beneficial 
cooperation in the SCS.58 While analysts may point to Beijing’s stalling of the Code of 
Conduct negotiations as evidence of China’s uncooperative attitude, Beijing has 
nonetheless demonstrated a cooperative approach to the dispute by seeking joint 
agreements with other claimant states, such as the 2005 joint agreement with Philippines 
and Vietnam to conduct exploration for oil and gas in the SCS.59 
Although China’s moderate approach was disrupted by a period of reactive 
assertiveness in dealing with the SCS disputes from 2009 to 2010, Beijing moved 
decisively from late 2010 to reassure ASEAN states of China’s good neighborliness and 
commitment toward peaceful development. In December 2010, State Councilor Dai 
Bingguo issued a major speech that advocated China’s adherence to the path of peaceful 
development.60 In January 2011, Hu reaffirmed that “China would emphasize the positive 
in future relations; it would endeavor to build mutually beneficial relations that will 
deepen trust and allow differences over territorial and other issues to be handled 
according to international norms and in the spirit of mutual accommodation.”61 In a sign 
of good faith, China agreed to the guidelines to implement the DOC in July 2011.62 In 
driving the point home even further, China released the “White Paper on Peaceful 
Development” in September 2011.63 
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While some analysts have argued that China’s assertiveness in the SCS disputes 
may have undermined China’s regional engagement efforts and strained bilateral 
relations with some claimant states, most Southeast Asian states emphasized their 
positive relations with Hu’s government.64 Overall, under Hu’s leadership Beijing 
successfully presented China’s rise as an opportunity (rather than a threat) through astute 
diplomacy, strategic partnerships, economic and regional cooperation, and adherence to 
the policy of peaceful development. 
B. XI’S FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
Since Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in late 2012, Southeast Asia has witnessed 
three important shifts in China’s behavior within the region. First, Southeast Asian states 
have witnessed a more proactive Chinese leadership in promoting extensive cooperation 
that would serve to integrate the region. Second, Southeast Asian states have also 
witnessed greater provocative actions from China in the latest round of tensions in the 
SCS disputes that started in 2012. Third, some Southeast Asian states have experienced 
Beijing’s carrot-and-stick approach—composed of the use of economic and political 
incentives or coercion—to compel these states into accommodating China’s interests. 
China’s proactive and assertive behaviors have generated an “assertive China discourse” 
that views China’s policy as evolving from a “keeping a low profile” approach toward a 
“striving for achievements” strategy.65  
1. Continuity: Adherence to the Path of Peaceful Development 
Although many China analysts have concurred that China’s policy has shifted, 
these analysts have also agreed that China’s policy has shown a great deal of continuity 
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with Hu’s policy of peaceful development.66 Most analysts point to Xi’s key addresses at 
the “conference on the diplomatic work with neighboring countries” in October 2013 and 
the Foreign Affairs Work Conference (FAWC) in November 2014 to validate China’s 
continuity in foreign policy. In both speeches, Xi stressed that China remains committed 
to the peaceful development path, the continued emphasis on neighboring diplomacy, the 
advancement of multilateral diplomacy, and the promotion of mutually beneficial 
cooperation.67 Chinese Professor Qin Yaqing argues that Xi’s speeches have shown 
continuity in China’s “overall strategic objectives, design, and policies” since Beijing 
continues to focus on maintaining a favorable regional environment for domestic 
development.68   
2. Change: A Proactive and Assertive Approach  
Although China’s foreign policy under Xi’s leadership has shown continuity, 
there have also been four key shifts: (1) a greater priority on neighborhood diplomacy; 
(2) a more proactive approach in shaping the regional environment; (3) a greater 
assertiveness in defending China’s national interests; and (4) a greater emphasis on 
strategic relations based on reciprocity.  
(1) Priority on Neighborhood Diplomacy  
Under Xi’s leadership, Beijing has elevated the importance of neighborhood 
diplomacy in its overall diplomatic agenda. The emphasis on neighborhood diplomacy 
                                                 
66 Yaqing Qin, “Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China’s International 
Strategy,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2014): 285–314, doi: 10.1093/cjip/pou034; Jian 
Zhang, “China’s New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: Towards ‘Peaceful Rise 2.0’?” Global Change, 
Peace & Security: Formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 27, no. 1 (2015): 5–19, 
doi: 10.1080/14781158.2015.993958; Christopher Johnson, Thoughts from the Chairman: Xi Jinping 
Unveils His Foreign Policy Vision (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 
December 2014), http://csis.org/publication/thoughts-chairman-xi-jinping-unveils-his-foreign-policy-
vision.  
67 Xi Jinping, “Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighboring 
Countries,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 25, 2013, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1093870.shtml; Xi 
Jinping, “The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Was Held in Beijing,” Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 29, 2014, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml. 
68 Qin, “Continuity through Change,” 285–314. 
 29 
has been a continuation of policy from Hu’s government, which was affirmed during the 
2004 National People’s Congress that “great powers are the key, the periphery is the 
priority, [and] developing countries are the foundation.”69 However, under Xi’s 
government, China’s relationships with its neighboring countries, which include 
Southeast Asian states, have been prioritized over the United States and other great 
powers. Analysts have pointed to four key pieces of evidence of China’s prioritization 
toward its neighborhood diplomacy—in particular on Southeast Asia. First, within a year 
of taking over office, the Chinese leadership visited almost all of the Southeast Asian 
states and conducted high-level contacts with its regional neighbors. Second, during these 
official visits, Chinese leaders have similarly emphasized China’s periphery as a “priority 
direction” for foreign policy. Third, Beijing held its first work conference on diplomacy 
with neighboring countries in October 2013 to provide policy guidance for peripheral 
diplomacy. Fourth, the authoritative policy report from the FAWC in November 2014 
formalized China’s periphery—such as the Southeast Asian region—as a priority in 
China’s foreign affairs.70  
(2) Proactive Approach in Shaping the Regional Environment 
China’s neighborhood diplomacy in Southeast Asia has also been accompanied by 
Xi’s vision of establishing a “community of common destiny.” 71 Since 2013, Xi has used 
this vision to further strengthen China’s relationship with Southeast Asia. During Xi’s 
first visit to Indonesia in October 2013, he announced China’s intentions to “build a more 
closely-knit China-ASEAN community of common destiny so as to bring more benefits 
to both China and ASEAN and to the people in the region.”72 The commitment toward 
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building the community of common destiny has since been reiterated by Chinese leaders 
during state visits and in ASEAN forums. 
The “community of common destiny” concept not only encompasses the 
continuation of the peaceful development strategy from Hu’s administration, but it also 
represents China’s efforts to play a leadership role in shaping the regional environment 
through various Chinese initiatives.73 At the ASEAN-China Summit in October 2013, 
Premier Li introduced a cooperation framework that emphasized a “two-point political 
consensus” and a seven-point proposal: the political consensus emphasized the promotion 
of China-ASEAN political cooperation, security cooperation, and economic development 
in parallel; the seven-point proposal encompassed various Chinese initiatives to 
strengthen multi-dimensional cooperation that would “achieve common development” 
and “enhance strategic mutual trust.”74  
Under the ambit of forging a common destiny, China has proposed four key 
initiatives.75 First, China seeks to build a regional financial platform through the 
establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The AIIB, which has 
been established since October 2014 with all 10 ASEAN states as members, aims to 
enhance economic development through infrastructure growth. Second, China wants to 
expand regional connectivity with Southeast Asia through the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road initiative, which would serve to strengthen maritime cooperation and integrate 
markets between China and maritime Southeast Asian states. Third, China has sought to 
advance economic integration through upgrading the CAFTA and supporting the 
implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to further 
boost economic and trade cooperation. Fourth, China has committed to providing 
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investment and financial assistance to members of ASEAN. These financial 
commitments include US$20 billion to develop the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, 
US$10 billion concessional loans to boost China-ASEAN cooperation, RMB$3 billion of 
assistance gratis to less developed ASEAN countries, and US$10 billion special loan 
from China Development Bank for China-ASEAN infrastructure development. Through 
these initiatives, China aims to proactively shape Asian regionalism, and to lead China-
ASEAN cooperation from a “golden decade” to a “diamond decade.”76 
(3) Greater Assertiveness in Defending China’s National Interests 
Although Xi has declared China’s commitment to peaceful development, he has 
also stressed the need to forcefully defend China’s national interests. At the FAWC in 
November 2014, Xi emphasized that China should turn its “neighborhood areas into a 
community of common destiny,” but in pursuing peaceful development, China will never 
relinquish its “legitimate rights and interests, or allow China’s core interests to be 
undermined.”77 According to Bonnie Glaser, comments from Chinese officials have 
indicated that Hu’s policy of “‘shelving sovereignty and pursuing joint development’ has 
apparently been judged a failure in recent years”; hence, Xi has “adopted an unbending 
stance on sovereignty issues.” 78  
Xi’s emphasis on protecting China’s national interests is also reflected in his call 
for the PLA to accelerate its military modernization and operational capabilities. During 
the National People’s Congress in 2014, Xi called on the PLA to build up China’s 
military capabilities, reiterating that “‘we long for peace dearly, but at any time and under 
any circumstances, we will not give up defending our legitimate national interests and 
rights, and will not sacrifice our core national interests.’”79 Xi’s military push has also 
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been articulated in China’s latest 2015 Defense White Paper on “China’s military 
strategy.” For the first time, China has articulated an “active defense” strategic concept 
that includes shifting force development from “‘offshore waters defense’ to the 
combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ and ‘open seas protection’” in order to 
“safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”80  
Xi’s strong emphasis on defending China’s national interests has therefore 
resulted in greater assertive actions in the SCS dispute. Although Hu’s government had 
also adopted an assertive stance in order to safeguard China’s sovereignty in the SCS, 
Xi’s policy focus has seen China proactively advancing these claims. According to the 
2015 International Crisis Group (ICG) report, Beijing has previously justified that its 
assertive actions were in response to other rival claimants’ provocative moves; however, 
China’s oil-rig deployment in May 2014 was not a tit-for-tat response.81 Similarly, 
China’s extensive island reclamation activities since 2014 have been unprecedented in 
scale, raising protests from the United States and other claimant states. China’s actions 
have left ICG to conclude that Xi’s “foreign policy style has been characterized by . . . 
muscular actions, leading domestic and external observers to conclude he is more 
nationalist, more determined to assert maritime claims and less risk-averse than his 
predecessor.”82 
Despite China’s assertiveness in the SCS dispute, Beijing has struck a delicate 
balance of ensuring that the crisis does not spiral out of control vis-à-vis demonstrating 
China’s resolve to defend its territorial and maritime claims. After the escalation of the 
SCS dispute with Philippines, China renewed its interest on negotiating the 
implementation of the DOC and discussing the crafting of the Code of Conduct in the 
SCS (COC) in order to defuse tensions. Although this “well-established practice of 
oscillating between assertive actions to expand control followed by gestures to repair 
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diplomatic ties and consolidate gains” has been observed in the past, ICG reports that 
“this cycle has become more compressed in recent years, with shorter lulls and more-
frequent flare-ups,” which is indicative of China’s increased assertiveness in advancing 
its claims.83 
(4) Emphasis on Strategic Relations Based on Reciprocity 
Xi’s policy has also emphasized the development of strategic relations based on 
reciprocity. In analyzing Xi’s speech at the 12th National Congress in March 2013, Yan 
Xuetong points out that “the ‘new concept of morality and interests’ means that morality 
is superior to economic profits,” which is different from previous Chinese policy of 
giving “priority to economic concerns”; furthermore, Xi’s emphasis on “morality and 
justice” means that “China will make policy toward a given country according to the 
character of China’s relation with that country.”84 Taken together, Yan concludes that 
“China will decisively favor those who side with it with economic benefits and even 
security protections. On the contrary, those who are hostile to China will face much more 
sustained policies of sanctions and isolation.”85 This reciprocity-based approach was also 
echoed by Premier Li at the 2014 BFA when he declared that China believes in “repaying 
kindness with kindness and meeting wrongdoing with justice.”86 
China’s management of the SCS dispute with other claimant states points to the 
implementation of this reciprocity-based policy approach. When the Philippines initiated 
an international arbitration process in January 2013, Chinese foreign ministry officials 
visited Manila and “warned of negative implications for the Philippines trade, tourist 
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industry, and other interests” if the Philippines proceeded with the arbitration process.87 
In contrast, Vietnam’s willingness to hold bilateral negotiations to manage the maritime 
disputes (following escalating tensions in mid-2014) resulted in Chinese leaders visiting 
Hanoi to discuss ways to strengthen bilateral relations and deepen economic 
cooperation.88 Separately, China has proposed a “dual-track” approach where China 
would resolve disputes directly with the claimant countries, while China and ASEAN 
would continue to ensure stability and cooperation in the region.89  Sutter and Huang 
argue that China’s dual-track approach would allow Beijing to use the carrot-and-stick 
approach on recalcitrant claimant states while continuing to enhance win-win cooperation 
with other Southeast Asian states that are willing to accommodate China’s position in the 
SCS dispute.90 
In sum, shifts in Xi’s policy toward Southeast Asia have resulted in more 
proactive and assertive behaviors currently witnessed by Southeast Asian states. 
Nevertheless, China’s shift toward a more assertive policy posture has currently been 
limited to issues perceived as important to China’s national interests, such as territorial 
sovereignty and maritime rights in the SCS. Similarly, China’s use of coercive diplomacy 
has been restricted to states that challenge China’s national interests. In other areas, 
China has continued to reaffirm its commitment to the peaceful development policy and 
to promote win-win cooperation in Southeast Asia.  
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C. CHINA’S POLICY SHIFTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA’S 
POLICY RESPONSE 
The changes in China’s foreign policy under Xi’s government have important 
consequences for Southeast Asian states’ policy responses to China’s rise in the region. 
China’s growing economic clout and proactive diplomacy in forging a “community of 
common destiny” will fundamentally change the regional political and economic 
landscape and provide greater benefits to Southeast Asia. However, unlike Hu’s era 
where Southeast Asian states have been more reassured of China’s benign rise, Xi’s 
assertive approach in advancing China’s claims in the SCS dispute has compelled some 
Southeast Asian states to adjust their policy responses to deal with a more assertive 
China.  
From the benefits perspective, Southeast Asian states have gained from China’s 
commitments to peaceful development and mutually beneficial cooperation since the turn 
of the twenty-first century. With Beijing’s current proactive peripheral diplomacy and the 
proposed implementation of key Chinese initiatives, such as the 2+7 Cooperation 
Framework, AIIB, One Belt, One Road project, and RCEP, China has presented multiple 
opportunities for Southeast Asian countries to gain greater benefits through closer 
cooperation and deeper China-ASEAN relations. Moreover, in the next five years, China 
will “import more than US$10 trillion of goods, Chinese investments abroad will exceed 
US$500 billion, and more than 500 million outbound visits will be made by Chinese 
tourists.”91 Barring any unforeseen circumstances, China will continue to be the driver of 
regional economic growth and a significant contributor to the economic development of 
Southeast Asian economies. 
Despite the tremendous benefits associated with the various proposed economic 
initiatives, many Southeast Asian states view Beijing’s intentions with caution. Although 
greater economic cooperation may be beneficial in the short term, China’s growing 
economic preponderance in Southeast Asia over the longer term would give Beijing 
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greater policy leverage in dealing with regional issues. ASEAN states will certainly not 
forget Cambodia’s refusal to issue a joint communique (as the ASEAN Chair in 2012) 
because China was allegedly pressuring Cambodia not to release any statement that 
raised objections to China’s actions in the SCS. With Xi’s espoused policy of developing 
strategic relations based on reciprocity, it is even more likely that Beijing would use 
economic coercion and incentives to achieve China’s interest. Chinese observers have 
echoed that Beijing would “increasingly utilize its growing economic, political, and even 
military power at the very least to discourage (if not punish) other powers, and to shape 
their perceptions, so that they do not oppose or obstruct Chinese interests.”92  
From a security perspective, the perception of an increasing China threat has been 
shaped by China’s increasingly assertive stance in the SCS dispute, although this threat 
perception has varied among the individual Southeast Asian states. President Aquino has 
declared China as a security threat, and he compared China and Xi Jinping to Nazi 
Germany and Adolf Hitler during his speeches in February 2014 and June 2015.93 With 
continued aggression from China in the SCS dispute, the Philippines has embarked on a 
long-term military modernization program, tightened the Philippines-U.S. alliance, and 
strengthened defense relations with Japan, another U.S. alliance partner. Similarly, 
another claimant state, Vietnam, has also embarked on a military modernization plan and 
sought to strengthen its bilateral relations with the United States. Although Indonesia is 
not a claimant state, it has recently stepped up diplomatic, legal, and military measures to 
contest China’s nine-dash line claims, which partly overlaps with Indonesia’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands. Although Singapore has avoided taking 
sides in the dispute, it continues to voice concerns that China’s assertiveness has the 
potential to destabilize the region, and it welcomes a greater U.S. role in enhancing 
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regional security. Other Southeast Asian states have downplayed the dispute and have 
preferred a policy of engagement with China for political and economic gains.94 
The diverse responses to China’s policy shifts highlight that Southeast Asian 
states face different strategic considerations. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to analyze in depth the drivers of Southeast Asia’s policy responses, it is recognized that 
only the Philippines seems to have taken sides with the United States to balance against 
China; other Southeast Asian states have continued to subscribe to strategic hedging—
albeit adjusting toward the balancing side—or some form of limited bandwagoning 
behaviors. Ultimately, how each Southeast Asian state responds to future changes in 
China’s policy depends on the strategic calculus between the expectations of greater 
benefits from an improved relation with China vis-à-vis the perception of China as a 
security threat.95  
D. CONCLUSION 
Under Xi’s leadership, China’s foreign policy has demonstrated both continuity 
and change. The continuity of China’s peaceful development policy reflects Beijing’s 
strategic goal of maintaining a favorable external environment for China’s domestic 
development. Xi’s government has also recognized that the geopolitical landscape has 
changed; therefore, China has shifted its policy by according a greater priority and 
emphasizing a more proactive approach in order to shape a regional environment more 
favorable to China’s rise. China has also changed its past emphasis of cultivating 
beneficial economic relations with all states in favor of a selective strategy that rewards 
states that accommodate China’s interests and help to facilitate China’s peaceful 
development. 
The most controversial policy shift has been China’s greater assertiveness in 
advancing its territorial and maritime claims in the SCS, which seem to contradict with 
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China’s overall policy of peaceful development. Although China’s assertiveness in the 
SCS certainly did not begin with Xi’s government, his stronger emphasis—compared to 
Hu’s government—on defending China’s national interests has resulted in China 
becoming more proactive and aggressive in advancing its claims in the SCS. Even if 
China views its assertiveness as “defensive,” analysts have rightfully pointed out that a 
policy “designed to build and demonstrate China’s strength work against China’s desire 
to avoid frightening other countries into security cooperation against China.”96 As a 
consequence, Beijing’s greater assertiveness in recent years has eroded the goodwill 
accumulated through its charm diplomacy, damaged bilateral relations with some of the 
other Southeast Asian claimant states, and increased the risk of destabilizing the regional 
security environment. Rising concerns of the China threat have also driven some 
Southeast Asian states to strengthen their relations with the United States to balance or 
hedge against an increasingly assertive China.  
China’s policy shifts have presented Southeast Asian states with two pathways. 
Countries that continue to accommodate China’s interests are promised greater benefits 
through mutually beneficial cooperation. In contrast, countries that continue to challenge 
or oppose China’s interests are likely to face coercive pressures and intimidation to force 
them to acquiesce to China’s demands. Therefore, Southeast Asian states face a growing 
challenge of juggling between maximizing benefits through developing closer strategic 
relations with a rising China vis-à-vis protecting their own interests by adopting stronger 




                                                 




III. INDONESIA’S CHINA POLICY 
Indonesia-China relations have often been characterized by “persistent 
ambivalence.”97 Indonesia’s ambivalence toward China has been influenced by two 
conflicting views. On the one hand, Indonesian political elites view China’s peaceful 
development as playing a positive role in maintaining stability and prosperity in the 
region. With China’s peaceful rise, they expect that Indonesia will benefit economically 
as China’s growing economy becomes the driver of regional economic growth. In 
addition, some elites perceive China as an effective counterbalance against the hegemony 
of the United States in the region. On the other hand, Indonesia has traditionally viewed 
China as a threat due to concern over China’s revisionist intentions. The China threat 
discourse continues to dominate Indonesia’s political and military circles in the face of 
strategic uncertainty about China’s rise. 
Where Indonesia’s foreign policy is concerned, Jakarta has consistently upheld 
the long-standing “free and active” (bebas aktif) principle as the core tenet of its foreign 
policy toward the great powers. From “rowing between two reefs” to “navigating a 
turbulent ocean,” these expressions represent Indonesia’s policy of maintaining a 
“dynamic equilibrium” among major powers.98 Indonesia’s foreign policy toward 
China’s rise has predominantly been centered on a middle position between China, the 
rising great power, and the United States, the regional hegemon.99 This hedging strategy 
has allowed Indonesia to maintain its autonomy and policy maneuvering space, and at the 
same, enabled Indonesia to benefit from China’s rise while addressing the security 
challenges associated with the strategic uncertainties of geopolitical changes. 
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With China’s policy shifting toward a proactive and assertive approach, as argued 
in Chapter II, Indonesia faces a growing dilemma concerning China’s rise: Indonesia 
views China as a strategic partner, but it increasingly perceives China as a potential long-
term threat. Indonesia has continued to pursue an active hedging strategy through 
building a closer economic relationship with China to benefit from China’s growing 
economy, while strengthening bilateral relations with the United States and other major 
powers to maximize security benefits and to moderate the risk of a potentially revisionist 
China. 
This chapter explores Indonesia’s relations with China since the founding of the 
New Order regime in 1965 to highlight Indonesia’s framing of the China threat. It goes 
on to address how Indonesia’s ambivalence toward China has led Jakarta to pursue a 
hedging strategy since the turn of the twenty-first century. The chapter then focuses on 
how President Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) government has responded to China’s policy 
shifts.  
A. 1965–2000: INDONESIA-CHINA HISTORICAL RELATIONS  
Indonesia’s historical relationship with China has been characterized by enmity 
and distrust due to a perceived China threat. Under Suharto’s New Order regime 
established in 1965, China was perpetuated as the principal source of threat to 
Indonesia’s national security until Indonesia-China bilateral ties were normalized in 
August 1990. Even after normalization of ties, Indonesian ruling elites remained 
suspicious of China’s intentions and called for vigilance in dealing with China. It was 
only after the end of the New Order regime with President Suharto’s resignation in May 
1998 that ushered in an era of improving Indonesia-China relations, but strategic 
concerns remained with China’s potential hegemonic intent in the region. 
The historical animosity against China traces back to the founding of Suharto’s 
New Order regime in 1965. The New Order regime came into power following an 
attempted coup in October 1965 that was blamed on the Indonesian Communist Party, the 
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). The Indonesian Armed Forces suppressed the PKI, 
removed the pro-communist President Sukarno from power, and installed General 
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Suharto as the President of the New Order regime. Due to China’s political and financial 
support for the PKI since the 1950s, Suharto accused China of being involved in the coup 
attempt, which eventually resulted in the suspension of diplomatic relations between the 
two countries in October 1967.100 
Under Suharto’s regime, the three sources of the “China threat”—composed of 
communist China, the PKI, and the ethnic Chinese population in Indonesia—were 
promulgated as the key threats to Indonesia’s national security. According to Rizal 
Sukma, “China was seen as an external threat . . . through [its] subversive activities, 
especially in helping the PKI to make a comeback; between the internal and external 
communist threats stood the ethnic-Chinese community which was suspected by the New 
Order government of providing a potential link between the two.”101 Suharto leveraged 
the perceived China threat to bolster his regime’s political legitimacy and to justify an 
assimilation policy that implemented “discriminative measures against its Chinese 
minority.”102 Sukma argues that the need for Suharto to sustain his regime’s political 
legitimacy through the promulgation of the China threat “prevented Jakarta from 
restoring diplomatic ties with Beijing for almost 23 years.”103 
Even after normalization of ties with China in August 1990, suspicions of China’s 
intentions remained, and Indonesian elites called for vigilance in dealing with China. 
Indonesia adopted a cautious approach in developing its relations with China, and 
bilateral cooperation in the early 1990s were predominantly focused on trade and 
investments. Where political-security relations were concerned, Indonesia preferred to 
engage China within ASEAN’s multilateral framework such as the ARF. 104 
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Indonesia’s wariness of China in the 1990s was reinforced through two events. 
The first was the anti-Chinese riots that occurred in North Sumatra during April 1994. In 
response to the riots against ethnic Chinese, Beijing issued a statement that called upon 
Jakarta to end the violence. In return, the Indonesian government accused China of 
interfering with its domestic affairs. Jakarta perceived China’s protest as undermining 
Indonesia’s sovereignty over its ethnic Chinese minority and questioning Jakarta’s 
management of its own internal affairs.105  
The second event revolved around China’s claims in the SCS dispute. Although 
Indonesia has no claims in the territorial dispute, China’s extensive maritime claims 
extend into Indonesia’s EEZ near the Natuna waters. After China  presented the nine-
dash line claims  at the 1993 Surabaya workshop, Indonesia sought clarification on 
Beijing’s claims in the Natunas; however, China frustrated Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts 
to seek resolution on the overlapping claims by stating that negotiations would be 
necessary to resolve the overlapping maritime boundaries.106 With China’s seizure of the 
Mischief Reef in 1995, China’s actions served to reinforce the Indonesian government’s 
apprehension of China as a security threat.107  
With growing security concerns over China’s military powers and assertive 
behaviors in the SCS, Suharto’s government offered the U.S. military access to 
Indonesia’s naval facilities in Surabaya for repairs and port calls to help sustain the U.S. 
military commitments in the region. In addition, Suharto concluded a security agreement 
with Australia in December 1995, which was a deviation from Indonesia’s traditional 
policy of non-alignment. Some analysts viewed these policy actions undertaken by 
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Suharto’s government as efforts to deal with the security concerns of China’s growing 
powers and likely hegemonic intent.108 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis was a defining moment in Indonesia-China 
relations from three perspectives. First, China’s response to the crisis and its aftermath 
heralded a shift in Jakarta’s perception of China. Beijing’s financial aid packages to 
Indonesia and refusal to devalue the Chinese currency during the crisis demonstrated 
Chinese goodwill to Indonesia. In addition, China’s charm diplomacy, good neighbor 
policy, and active engagements in ASEAN institutions in the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis also helped to alleviate the China threat perception.109 
Second, China’s measured response to the anti-government riots in May 1998, 
which brutally attacked Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese community, prevented the incident 
from complicating bilateral relations. In contrast to the 1994 riots, even though Beijing 
expressed concerns over the attacks against Chinese Indonesians, Chinese leaders 
deliberately emphasized that the issue was an internal affair and had no intentions of 
letting the issue affect bilateral relations.110 
Third, the financial crisis led to the collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime, 
which enabled the newly democratized government to pursue a different policy course 
toward China. President Wahid, who was democratically elected in October 1999, 
accorded high priority toward improving Indonesia-China relations. He made China his 
first visit, and both countries signed a joint communique pledging to strengthen 
cooperation and exchange. Wahid also initiated the abolishment of discriminatory 
policies against the Indonesian Chinese, which helped to restore confidence of the 
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democratic Indonesian government in forging closer relations with China and the Chinese 
business communities.111  
Despite Indonesia’s receptivity to closer Indonesia-China relations in the 
aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, Indonesia’s historical enmity and distrust of China 
has entrenched a deep-rooted wariness of China’s growing powers and future intentions. 
According to prominent Southeast Asian analyst Daniel Novotny, there was a prevalent 
belief in the late 1990s “among the Indonesian leadership that the rapidly growing 
Chinese economy will be translated into an enhanced military power which may in turn 
lead Beijing to pursue aggressive expansionism in the region.”112 Such suspicions of 
China’s future intentions among Indonesian political elites would set the stage for 
Indonesia’s ambivalence of China’s rise in the turn of the twenty-first century. 
B. 2001–2011: INDONESIA’S POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH CHINA 
The progress of democratic consolidation and China’s charm diplomacy since 
1998 has reduced the perception of the China threat, but as mentioned above, Indonesian 
political elites continue to remain ambivalent toward China. China’s rise has been viewed 
as an opportunity and a challenge, and China has been considered as a competitor and a 
partner. This section examines the evolving considerations and implementation of 
Indonesia’s hedging strategy vis-à-vis China.  
1. Evolving Strategic Considerations in Indonesia’s China Policy 
Under President Megawati’s administration from 2001 to 2004, Indonesia’s 
priority was to address its many domestic problems and to reform the national political 
system. Nevertheless, Indonesia maintained cordial relations with China, and the 
government focused on establishing close economic cooperation, especially in the energy 
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sector. At the regional level, Indonesia kept a low profile and sought to manage the 
uncertainties of China’s rise through the framework of ASEAN.113  
When Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected as President in 2004, Indonesia 
had already become more confident in dealing with China. Sukma claims that “Indonesia 
no longer sees China as a direct threat to Indonesia’s national security and internal 
stability.”114 Two factors have accounted for this change in perception. First, China’s 
charm diplomacy since the late 1990s has alleviated concerns of the China threat. As 
discussed in Chapter II, China’s peaceful development policy has been positively viewed 
by Indonesia and the region, and Indonesia now perceives China as a responsible and 
benevolent rising power. This positive perception was further reinforced when China 
responded rapidly to provide aid during the tsunami disaster that struck Indonesia in 
December 2004. Second, Indonesia’s democratization process since 1998 has reduced the 
anti-Chinese prejudice and discrimination. When Indonesia democratized, Sukma argues 
that “perpetuating the Chinese threat as the basis of regime legitimacy would no longer 
be attainable.”115 The resolution (though not complete elimination) of the ethnic Chinese 
problem helped to remove an obstacle that would have hindered Indonesia’s relations 
with China. 
Nevertheless, Indonesia continues to remain ambivalent on China’s rise. From the 
economic dimension, China’s growing economy has been perceived as an opportunity 
and a threat. According to Laksmana, although “China presents huge economic 
opportunities,” many Indonesian policymakers “fear that a growing engagement with 
China might someday translate into dependency” that would provide China with a 
political leverage.116 From the security dimension, ambivalence is centered on China’s 
long-term intentions. On the one hand, some Indonesian elites have embraced China’s 
rise and its engagements in regional institutions because they see China as a “balancer to 
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American unilateralist designs in the region.”117  On the other hand, strategic concerns of 
“how China is going to use its newly acquired wealth and military power” have continued 
to reinforce the perception of a potential China threat.118 According to a survey 
conducted by Novotny in 2004, the results indicated that 78 percent of Indonesian elites 
perceived to some degree that China’s rise would lead to future hegemonic intentions.119 
2. Implementing the Hedging Strategy 
Due to the strategic uncertainty of China’s long-term intentions, Indonesia has 
adopted a hedging strategy to deal with China’s rise. As discussed in Chapter I, the 
hedging strategy consists of a mix of policy tools to minimize the potential China threat 
and maximize the benefits and opportunities associated with China’s rise. Under 
Yudhoyono’s leadership, Indonesia’s hedging preference consisted of strengthening 
bilateral relations with China for economic benefits while pursuing closer bilateral 
relations with the United States and other powers to counterbalance China’s growing 
powers. At the same time, Jakarta continued to play an active role in ASEAN to shape the 
regional architecture in order to maintain a dynamic equilibrium of power influences in 
the region. Indonesia operationalized its hedging strategy through implementing three 
key policy tools: economic pragmatism, strategic engagement, and soft balancing 
policies.   
a. Economic Pragmatism Policy: Economic Benefits and Competition 
Economic pragmatism refers to “a policy wherein a state seeks to maximize 
economic gains from its direct trade and investment links with a Great Power.”120 
Indonesia’s economic cooperation with China has focused on trade, investment, and the 
development of key sectors in Indonesia’s economy. As the world’s largest populous 
state, China is an important market for Indonesian products. Similarly, Indonesia—as the 
world’s fourth largest populous state—represents an important export market for Chinese 
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goods. In addition, Indonesia is also the world’s second largest coal exporter and world’s 
largest palm oil exporter, and these natural resources are becoming increasingly vital to 
fuel China’s growing economy. At the same time, Indonesia requires extensive 
investments in infrastructure to expand its under-developed economy.  
Given these convergence of economic interests, implementing pragmatic win-win 
economic cooperation with China has enabled Indonesia to maximize its own economic 
gains and bolster economic growth and development. With the abundance of natural 
resources, Indonesia has become an important energy supplier to meet China’s growing 
energy demands. Under Megawati’s government, economic cooperation focused 
prominently on the energy sector. Megawati’s government established the 1st Indonesia-
China Energy forum in 2002 to enhance energy cooperation in the oil and gas sector.121 
Since the initiation of this forum, a large number of deals have been signed. Chinese 
state-owned companies such as Petrochina, Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation have acquired operational rights in Indonesian oil and gas fields and invested 
in oil and energy infrastructure.122  
In terms of trade, economic re-engagement under Yudhoyono’s government 
significantly expanded bilateral trade (see Table 3). In 2004, Indonesia’s total trade with 
China amounted to US$10.4 billion, accounting for 8.7 percent of Indonesia’s world 
trade. Bilateral trade surged to US$40.5 billion in 2010, accounting for 13.8 percent of 
Indonesia’s world trade.123 The implementation of the CAFTA in 2010 resulted in a 
substantial increase in overall trade, with trade increasing by US$10.2 billion and 
US$14.3 billion in 2010 and 2011, respectively. As a result of greater economic 
cooperation in trade, China rose from being Indonesia’s fifth-largest trading partner in 
2004 to become one of Indonesia’s largest trading partner in 2010.124 
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Table 3.   Statistics of Indonesia-China Total Trade in Goods (2004–
2011).125 
 
China has become a key investor and a major financier to Indonesia. In terms of 
investment, more than 1,000 Chinese companies with investments of over $6 billion were 
operating in Indonesia at the end of 2010.126 During Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to 
Jakarta for the Indonesia-China Strategic Business Dialogue in 2011, investment deals 
worth a total of US$10 billion were signed.127 In addition, China has also been actively 
involved in major infrastructure projects in Indonesia. A prominent symbol of Indonesia-
China cooperation in infrastructure investment has been the Suramadu Bridge; it was 
jointly built by Indonesia-China joint consortiums and mostly financed using Chinese 
soft loans. The significance of Chinese investments in Indonesia has not gone 
unnoticed—a Jakarta Post article in 2010 highlighted that China has “become a major 
financier to mega projects in Indonesia, the role played by the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), Europe, Japan, and the United States in the past.”128  
Economic cooperation with China has not been without its challenges. Many 
Indonesian elites view China as a competitor and, in some extreme cases, as an economic 
threat. A key source of friction between China and Indonesia has been the 
implementation of the CAFTA. Protests from various domestic groups have centered on 
“the poor quality of cheap Chinese products,” the inability of Indonesia’s “small and 
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Total Trade with China 
+HK (US$ billion) 
10.4 14.3 17.0 20.4 31.1 29.3 40.5 54.8 
Indonesia’s Total Trade (%) 8.7 9.9 10.5 10.8 11.7 13.7 13.8 14.4 
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medium enterprises to compete with Chinese products in the domestic and regional 
market,” and the need to protect Indonesia’s agriculture sector.129 With the trade deficit 
rising to US$5 billion in the first year of CAFTA’s implementation, some analysts have 
alleged that CAFTA had “contributed to the downturn of as much as 20 per cent of 
Indonesia’s industrial capacity and 15 per cent of job losses.”130 Even though China has 
extended help to alleviate the negative impact of the CAFTA through preferential export 
buyers’ credit and financing, these overtures have not been sufficient to overcome the 
view of China as a competitor in economic relations. 
b. Strategic Engagement: Maximizing Benefits 
Strategic engagement refers to a policy wherein a state seeks strategic cooperation 
to enhance mutual benefits and develop greater bilateral communication and mutual trust. 
By increasing bilateral communication and institutionalizing interactions, Indonesia’s 
strategic engagement with China establishes venues to address potential conflict of 
interests and to develop strategic interests for mutual benefits.131 Indonesia’s strategic 
engagement with China has been evident from the frequent high-level visits between the 
two countries, the declaration of the Indonesia-China Strategic Partnership, and the 
expansion of strategic cooperation to include defense cooperation. 
Indonesia’s policy of seeking strategic engagement with China has been a foreign 
policy priority under President Yudhoyono’s leadership. This engagement policy has 
been reflected in the frequent exchange of high-level visits by state leaders and key party 
officials from both countries (see Table 4). These high-level visits helped to enhance 
bilateral relations through discussions on strengthening strategic cooperation and 
adoption of cooperative agreements. 
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Table 4.   Indonesia-China High-Level Visits (2005–2011) 





Official Visit to Jakarta 
Hosted by President 
Yudhoyono 
-Joint Declaration of Indonesia-
China Strategic Partnership 





Official Visit to Beijing 
Hosted by President Hu 
-Signed five agreements: Economic 
programs, tsunami assistance, 





Official Visit to Jakarta 
Hosted by Vice-President 
Kalla 






Met Vice President 
Zeng Qinghong 






2nd Energy Forum Shanghai 
Hosted by Vice-Premier 
Huang Hu 






Official Visit to Beijing 
Hosted by Vice-President 
Zeng Qinghong 






Official Visit to Jakarta 
Hosted by President 
Yudhoyono 






3rd Energy Forum in Jakarta 
Hosted by Vice-President 
Kalla 
-Signed eight energy and mining 





Official Visit to Beijing 
Hosted by FM Yang and 
Vice-Premier Li 





APEC Summit in Singapore 
Bilateral Meeting with 
President Hu 







Met with President 
Yudhoyono 
-Signed Action Plan for the 
Implementation of Joint Declaration 





G20 Summit in Canada 
Bilateral Meeting with 
President Hu 






Official Visit to Beijing 
Met with Premier Wen and 
Vice President Xi 





Official Visit to Jakarta 
Met with President 
Yudhoyono 
-Signed economic and trade 






Official Visit to Jakarta 
Met with President 
Yudhoyono 
-Discussion on bilateral cooperation 
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Official Visit to Jakarta 
Hosted by Vice-President 
Kalla 
-Discussion on strengthening 
bilateral cooperation 
Note: (1) Only official state visits and dedicated bilateral meetings of key state leaders are highlighted. 
(2) Official Visits by top party officials that involve meeting key state leaders are selectively included. 
 
 
As part of Indonesia’s and China’s efforts to develop closer bilateral relations, 
both countries signed the Joint Declaration of the Indonesia-China Strategic Partnership 
in April 2005. Since the signing of the agreement, both countries have expanded bilateral 
ties to include political, security, and defense cooperation. Various cooperative 
mechanisms have also been institutionalized to facilitate closer cooperation in the various 
fields. 
A key part of Indonesia’s strategic engagement has been to develop closer defense 
cooperation and military ties with China through bilateral defense diplomacy.132 Under 
the strategic partnership framework, Indonesia pursued two key agendas. First, Indonesia 
implemented confidence building measures through dialogues and consultations, military 
exchanges, and combined training exercises. Since 2006, Indonesia and China have held 
annual defense consultations. As a sign of improving defense relations, two PLA Navy 
warships made a port call to Indonesia in March 2007. The signing of a defense 
cooperation agreement in 2007 led to exchanges of military students in their respective 
education and training institutions. In addition, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)-
PLA cooperation committee was also established as part of the defense agreement to 
coordinate joint military and training exercises. In 2011, Indonesia conducted its first 
joint anti-terrorism exercise (Sharp Knife 2011) with China. This was followed by a 
second exercise held in China in July 2012. Through these aspects of defense diplomacy, 
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Indonesia has strengthened military-to-military relations, enhanced mutual trust, and 
promoted the development of closer security cooperation.133 
Second, Indonesia strategically engaged China to secure military assistance, 
weapons acquisition, and assistance in developing domestic defense industries. Since the 
U.S. arms embargo imposed on Indonesia from 1999 to 2005 due to human rights 
violations in East Timor, Indonesia has sought to find alternative arms suppliers and 
develop its indigenous defense industries. Beijing’s assurance of providing arms and 
facilitating technology transfer “without any political strings” incentivized Indonesia to 
pursue closer defense partnership with China.134 In July 2005, Indonesia and China 
signed an agreement to enhance defense technology cooperation. This was also followed 
with the purchase of C802 anti-ship missiles, which according to Ian Storey, was the 
“first major purchase of Chinese manufactured weapons by Jakarta since the mid-
1960s.”135 Other proposed defense collaborations have followed, such as the agreement 
for joint production of military components and machines and the co-production of rocket 
launchers in 2008. However, despite the agreements signed, former Defense Minister 
Juwono claimed that defense collaboration “has been slow to develop due to reluctance 
on China’s part to transfer technology.”136 
c. Soft Balancing Policy: Mitigating the Potential Risks of a China Threat 
Indonesia has sought to mitigate the potential risks of a China threat through soft 
balancing, which is broadly defined as “tacit balancing short of formal alliance.”137 
Indonesia’s soft balancing policy against China is conducted through three channels: 
deepening military-defense ties with the United States to counterbalance China’s growing 
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military powers, improving bilateral relations with other major powers in Asia to counter 
against coercive pressure from China, and engaging China and the other major powers 
through ASEAN security institutions to maintain a stable balance of power. 
Indonesia, like most of the other Southeast Asian states, views the continued U.S. 
presence in the region as the most effective means to hedge against the rise of China as a 
revisionist power. Although efforts to develop closer security and military ties were 
hampered by U.S. sanctions against Indonesia from 1999 to 2005, the continuation of 
security ties since 2005 have facilitated closer security, defense, and military cooperation 
between the two countries. In pressing for closer bilateral relations with the United 
States, President Yudhoyono proposed a comprehensive partnership agreement with the 
United States in 2008, which eventually led to the signing of the Indonesia-U.S. 
Comprehensive Partnership and the Defense Framework Agreement (DFA) in November 
2010.138 With the full restoration of Indonesian-U.S. military ties under the DFA, nearly 
200 military exchanges and engagements have been conducted annually, and the United 
States has resumed arms sales to meet Indonesian defense requirements.139 
While Indonesia has sought closer security relations with the United States 
through the Comprehensive Partnership and the DFA, it does not mean that Indonesia has 
chosen to align with the United States in balancing against China’s rise. As alluded to by 
Ann Marie Murphy, Indonesia’s commitment to its free and active policy means that “it 
foreswears alliances and would never permit foreign bases on its soil, thereby setting 
outer limits to U.S.-Indonesian security cooperation.”140 In addition, although “Indonesia 
values the offshore balancing role that the United States plays and helps facilitate this by 
permitting the United States access to naval bases and ship repair facilities. It does not, 
however, necessarily share an interest in maintaining U.S. primacy in the broader Asia-
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Pacific.”141 Therefore, Indonesia has chosen to pursue a soft balancing—rather than a 
hard balancing—policy to hedge against the risks of a future China threat. 
Table 5.   Indonesia’s Strategic Partnership Agreements with Major Powers. 
 
In addition to the United States, Indonesia has sought to improve its bilateral 
relations with other major powers. Jakarta has signed strategic partnership agreements 
with Australia, Russia, Japan, India, and South Korea (see Table 5). Through diversifying 
its relations with other powers, Indonesia has provided some balance in countering 
China’s growing economic and political influence and avoiding being over-dependent on 
China, which would constrain its policy autonomy.  
Besides bilateral engagements with all the major powers in the region, Indonesia 
has sought to create a “dynamic equilibrium” to ensure a balance of power in Southeast 
Asia.142 Indonesia has played an active role in ASEAN to shape the regional security 
architecture and encourage “greater participation by other major and regional powers in 
the [ASEAN] regional processes,” which would facilitate a stable balance of power in the 
region.143 One of the ways that Indonesia encouraged greater participation of major 
powers in the region was to lobby for the expansion of EAS membership to include 
Australia, India, New Zealand, and the United States. Indonesia’s objective of supporting 
an inclusive regional framework was to counterbalance China’s influence in the EAS. 
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Countries Information on Strategic Partnerships 
Australia 1995 Security Agreement (defunct); 2005 Joint Declaration on Comprehensive 
Partnership; 2006 Lombok Treaty 
China 2005 Strategic Partnership 
United States 2010 U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership; 2010 Defense Framework Arrangement 
Russia 2004-2005 Strategic Partnership 
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South Korea 2006 Strategic Partnership Agreement 
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In addition, Indonesia believes that regional security can only be attained 
“through a cooperative security system” where all major powers, including the United 
States and China, would have a strategic interest in regional peace and prosperity.144 
Indonesia has sought to promote the ASEAN community and a broader East Asian 
community through supporting and leading various ASEAN initiatives, which would 
“provide an institutional framework that would facilitate a cooperative relationship 
among the major power,” especially China.145 
In sum, Indonesia’s hedging strategy in the first decade of the twenty-first century 
sought to benefit from China’s growing economy through closer bilateral cooperation 
while managing China’s rise through strategic engagement and soft balancing policies. It 
essentially kept to its free and active foreign policy approach by not aligning to any of the 
great powers and creating a dynamic equilibrium that has allowed Indonesia to promote a 
status quo regional order. 
C. 2012–2015: INDONESIA’S POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH CHINA 
Indonesian elites have perceived China’s policy shifts under President Xi’s 
leadership from two perspectives. The first is the expectation of greater economic 
benefits if Indonesia was to align closer to China. The second is the perception of an 
increasing security threat from China due to Beijing’s greater aggressive actions in the 
SCS disputes and increasing attempts to revise the status quo. Nonetheless, even within 
the Indonesian elite circles, this threat perception has varied between Indonesia’s political 
and military elites, with the latter emphasizing a greater concern with China’s recent 
actions highlighted in Chapter II. Given these views, Indonesian elites continued to 
remain ambivalent with regards to China’s future intentions. 
With the change in the Indonesian government after Jokowi Prabowo was elected 
as president in 2014, there has been a perceived adjustment in Indonesia’s hedging 
preference vis-à-vis China. Unlike Yudhoyono, who preferred to adhere to his foreign 
policy of “having a million friends and zero enemies” in dealing with China’s recent 
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policy shifts, Jokowi has signaled that his government would adopt a stronger balancing 
stance against China. This section examines in greater details the shift in policy responses 
between Yudhoyono’s government and the current Jokowi’s government in dealing with 
the China challenge. 
1. Yudhoyono’s Government: Maintaining a Measured Response to the 
China Challenge 
As Indonesia’s top trading partner and an increasingly important investor in 
Indonesia’s economy, China has been viewed as a strategic partner that would facilitate 
Indonesia’s continued economic growth and development. With China seeking to “build 
a more closely-knit China-ASEAN community of common destiny so as to bring more 
benefits to both China and ASEAN and to the people in the region,” Yudhoyono’s 
government proactively pursued a closer strategic partnership with China in order to 
bolster strategic cooperation, particularly in trade and investments, which would reap 
greater economic dividends.146  
At the same time, Yudhoyono’s government continued to actively hedge against a 
potentially revisionist China. However, he also cautiously avoided taking a 
confrontational position against China’s persistent infringement of Indonesia’s maritime 
waters that would jeopardize Indonesia’s interest in cultivating stronger economic ties 
with China. These perspectives highlighted Yudhoyono’s policy of maintaining his 
previous hedging preference of minimizing the potential China threat and maximizing the 
benefits and opportunities associated with China’s rise. 
a. Pursuing a Return-Maximizing Policy 
Indonesia’s active engagements with China reflect the growing priority of China 
as a strategic partner in Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda. With Xi’s government seeking 
to develop deeper strategic relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors, Indonesia and 
China elevated their bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2013, 
with both sides pledging to strengthen strategic cooperation, especially in the areas of 
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promoting regional interconnectivity and economic integration.147 With the elevation of 
ties, Indonesian and Chinese state leaders and top party officials have conducted high-
level visits to bolster strategic cooperation, especially in the area of defense cooperation 
(see Table 6). 
Table 6.   Indonesia-China High-Level Visits (October 2013–October 2014) 





Official Visit to Jakarta 
Hosted by President 
Yudhoyono 
-Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
-5-year plan to grow trade 
-100 billion RMB bilateral currency 
swap agreement 




Vice Chair CMC 
Fan Changlong 
Official Visit to Jakarta 
Met with Vice-President 
Boediono, hosted by Defense 
Minister Yugisantoro 






Official Visit to Beijing 
Met with Premier Li, 
Hosted by Vice Chair CMC 
Fan Changlong 
-Signed Defense Cooperation Agreement 
related to missile production 
 
Indonesia’s policy of forging closer economic cooperation has boosted bilateral 
trade. Indonesia-China trade grew to US$57.2 billion in 2013, accounting for 15.5 
percent of Indonesia’s world trade (see Table 7), and both countries have pledged to 
further strengthen cooperation to increase bilateral trade to US$80 billion.148  
Nevertheless, there continue to be two key economic challenges for Indonesia. The first 
challenge is the bilateral trade imbalance, which has been in favor of China. In 2012 and 
2013, the deficit reached US$7 billion and US$6.7 billion, respectively. Second, with 
increasing economic integration between the two economies and an increasing percentage 
of China’s trade accounting for Indonesia’s world trade, Indonesia is increasingly 
becoming more dependent on China’s economy to sustain its economic growth. In the 
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event of a slowing Chinese economy, it would also indirectly lead to slowing economic 
growth for Indonesia.   
Table 7.   Indonesia’s Bilateral Trade Statistics with China (2012–2013).149 
 2012 2013 
Exports to China + HK (US$ billion) 24.29 25.29 
Imports from China + HK (US$ billion) 31.32 31.94 
Trade Imbalance (US$ billion) -7.03 -6.65 
Total Trade (US$ billion) 55.61 57.23 
Percentage of Indonesia’s World Trade 14.6% 15.5% 
 
b. Maintaining the Risk-Contingency Option  
In recent years, fears of the China threat have risen due to various Chinese actions 
against Indonesian maritime interests. As Murphy points out, “China has taken a number 
of aggressive actions against Indonesian interests in the Natuna Island waters.”150 In 
2010, an Indonesian patrol boat arrested a Chinese vessel fishing illegally within its EEZ, 
but China dispatched an armed maritime law enforcement vessel to force the Indonesian 
patrol boat to release the Chinese vessel. With China’s recent aggressiveness in enforcing 
its sovereignty claims in the SCS, a more serious confrontation occurred in March 2013. 
In this incident, nine Chinese crew were caught fishing illegally in the Natuna waters, and 
they were transferred to the Indonesian patrol boat to be taken ashore. However, the 
Indonesians were forced to release the Chinese crew when an armed Chinese maritime 
law enforcement vessel pursued the Indonesian patrol boat and threatened the use of 
force unless the Chinese nationals were released.151  
Indonesia has always viewed Beijing’s nine-dash line claims with suspicion, 
given the potential overlap of China’s claim with Indonesia’s EEZ. China’s nine-dash 
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line claims in the SCS continue to be a potential source of tension whenever China 
asserts sovereignty over the maritime areas within the nine-dash lines without providing 
clarity on the basis of the claims. In the latest controversy, China issued new Chinese 
passports with China’s maritime boundaries that seemed to extend into Indonesia’s 
territorial waters. In response, General Moeldoko, Commander of the Indonesian 
National Armed Forces, expressed his dismay that “China has included parts of the 
Natuna Islands within the nine-dash line, thus apparently claiming a segment of 
Indonesia’s Riau Islands province as its territory.”152 
At the regional level, Indonesia views China as a threat to ASEAN unity and 
regional stability. According to Murphy, China’s political leverage on some of the 
smaller ASEAN countries poses a threat to Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN: China’s 
political coercion to force Cambodia not to issue a joint communique in 2012 was 
deemed “utterly irresponsible.”153 In order to salvage the situation, Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Natalegawa embarked on a shuttle diplomacy to secure a six-point consensus 
that was issued in place of the joint communique. With China’s increasing political clout, 
forging an ASEAN consensus on China’s assertiveness has split ASEAN unity, which is 
a threat to Indonesia’s interest since ASEAN has traditionally been the cornerstone of its 
foreign policy to maintain regional stability. 
Given the increased perception of threat, Yudhoyono’s government continued to 
actively hedge against a potentially revisionist China. In particular, Yudhoyono pursued 
internal balancing and soft balancing policies to hedge against China’s potentially 
revisionist rise. 
(1) Internal Balancing Policy 
With the perceived maritime security threat posed by Beijing’s growing 
assertiveness, the Indonesian military has declared plans to increase its capabilities to 
protect Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty near the Riau Islands. In his commentary in the 
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Wall Street Journal, General Moeldoko revealed that “the Indonesia military has decided 
to strengthen its forces on Natuna . . . . to meet any eventuality stemming from 
heightened tensions on one of the world’s key waterways.”154 Defense Minister 
Yusgiantoro similarly echoed in September 2014 that the Indonesian military would set 
up a defense base on Natuna Island to “secure the territories that border the South China 
Sea because the situation in those waters has been tense since several countries such as 
Vietnam, China, the Philippines, and Malaysia claimed the territorial waters as their 
own.”155 
Indonesia has also embarked on an ambitious military modernization plan to 
develop its air and naval capabilities to defend its maritime sovereignty against external 
threats. In 2011, the Obama’s administration agreed to the sale of twenty-four used F-16 
fighter aircraft as part of a US$700 million arms deal. This was followed by a US$500 
million arms deal that included the controversial sale of eight AH64 attack helicopters in 
2013.156 Indonesia has also accorded priority toward procuring attack submarines for the 
navy. In addition, Indonesia’s navy has also ordered Sigma-class corvettes and fast attack 
vessels to strengthen its naval military capabilities.157  
Indonesia’s military modernization has been funded through an increased defense 
budget (see Figure 1). From an annual military expenditure range of between US$4.3 to 
US$5.8 billion in 2009 to 2011, Indonesia’s defense spending have increased to a range 
of US$8–9 billion from 2012 to 2014. More significantly, Indonesia’s defense military 
expenditure as a percentage of the country’s GDP and government spending have also 
increased. Against the backdrop of China’s greater assertiveness in the SCS and 
Indonesia’s increasing perception of a China threat, the significant increase in defense 
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spending supports the proposition that Indonesia has focused on building up its military 
capabilities to address the security concerns of China’s rise. 
Figure 1.  Indonesia’s Military Expenditure (2009–2014).158 
 
 
(2) Soft Balancing Policy 
Since the signing of the Indonesia-U.S. comprehensive partnership and the 
defense framework agreement in 2010, Indonesia has pursued closer political and 
security alignment with the United States to mitigate Indonesia’s security concerns with 
regard to China’s rise. The importance of this strategic partnership was affirmed during 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa’s meeting with the U.S. Secretary of 
State John Kerry in May 2013, where Natalegawa emphasized that the comprehensive 
partnership between the two countries was “a partnership among friends, mutually 
beneficial . . . [with] a great deal of mutual interest.”159  
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Under the ambit of the defense framework agreement, Indonesia and the United 
States have increased the conduct of joint exercises and collaborated on a range of 
maritime security issues. The largest bilateral exercise has been the annual Cooperation 
Afloat Readiness and Training exercises, which focuses on enhancing maritime security 
capabilities and increasing interoperability between the two navies. Sea surveillance 
exercises have also been conducted by both militaries near the Natuna waters since 2012, 
which is indicative of Indonesia’s increasing perception of the China threat.160 
2. Jokowi’s Government: Leaning toward Balancing 
Since taking over as Indonesia’s seventh president in October 2014, Jokowi has 
announced his vision of Indonesia as a global maritime axis, which would project 
Indonesia as a credible Indo-Pacific maritime power. Based on the maritime axis 
doctrine, Jokowi’s focus on five key areas—maritime culture, maritime food sovereignty, 
maritime infrastructure and connectivity, maritime diplomacy, and maritime defense—
would serve Indonesia’s national interests by expanding its domestic economy, 
reasserting its authority over its maritime sovereignty, and enhancing its status as a 
regional middle power.161  
With Jokowi’s maritime axis doctrine driving Indonesia’s foreign policy and 
security agenda, there has been continuity and shifts in Indonesia’s policy toward China. 
Jokowi’s government has continued to adopt an active hedging strategy by pursuing both 
return-maximizing and risk-contingency options toward China. However, with Jokowi’s 
policy shift toward safeguarding Indonesia’s sovereignty, Jokowi’s government has also 
signaled that it will take a stronger stance against China’s challenge of Indonesia’s 
sovereignty. These three components of Jokowi’s policy toward China are further 
elaborated in the following sections. 
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a. Maintaining a Return-Maximizing Policy  
Jokowi has indicated that Indonesia will pursue a closer economic partnership 
with China to maximize the expectations of gains in trade and investments. With 
Indonesia’s decelerating growth in the last four years, investments have been sorely 
needed to assist with economic reforms. Jokowi’s vision of developing Indonesia into a 
maritime power requires substantial infrastructure investments to boost Indonesia’s 
maritime economy. Indonesia’s first coordinating minister for maritime affairs, 
Indroyono Soesilo, has stated that an estimated $6 billion in investments is needed to 
transform Indonesia’s port infrastructure.162 In addition, to achieve the 7 percent annual 
growth in its economy, Indonesia would need around US$740 billion for infrastructure 
development projects in the next five years.163 
With the need for investments, Indonesia has turned to China for assistance in 
infrastructure development. Within Jokowi’s first year in office, he has made three visits 
to Beijing (see Table 8) in order to court China to invest more in Indonesia’s 
infrastructure development. Jokowi has explicitly stated that “he wanted the [bilateral] 
strategic partnership to take ‘more concrete’ forms,” such as greater progress in the 
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Table 8.   Indonesia-China High-Level Visits (November 2014–April 2015). 





Official Visit to Jakarta 





Attend APEC in Beijing 
Bilateral Meetings with 
President Xi and Premier Li 





by  Minister 
Sofyan Djalil 
Bilateral Economic Dialogue 
Hosted by State Councilor 
Yang Jiechi 
-High-level discussion to strengthen 
economic cooperation 






Official Visit to Beijing 
Hosted by President Xi 
-Signed Five-Year Action Plan 
-Signed eight agreements to boost 
cooperation on areas such as trade, 
infrastructure development, aviation, 







Hosted by Premier Li 
-Companies from both countries signed 





Attend Asian-African Summit 
in Bandung 
Bilateral Meeting with 
President Jokowi in Jakarta 
-Issued Joint Communique to further 
deepen and expand bilateral cooperation 
in a wider area, setting targets as a follow 
up to the Action Plan signed in March. 
 
With both leaders recognizing that China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and 
Indonesia’s global maritime axis initiatives would have potential overlapping benefits for 
both countries, Indonesia and China have pledged to “forge a maritime partnership for 
common development and shared prosperity.” 165 Xi pledged China’s commitment to 
“support Indonesia’s efforts to accelerate maritime infrastructure development with the 
help of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund.” 166 In 
return, Jokowi has pledged to streamline investment processes and remove the red tape 
that has hindered the realization of Chinese investment projects. 
Despite the expectation of positive economic benefits from the development of 
the Indonesia-China maritime partnership for common development, there are doubts 
about whether this strategic partnership would yield dividends. According to the 
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Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Board, only $1.1 billion (or 6 percent) out of the 
planned US$18.4 billion Chinese investments have been realized. Given the low amount 
of realized investment, China has been ranked 13th in terms of foreign direct investment 
in Indonesia, losing out even to Taiwan (see Figure 2). While bureaucratic red tape—to 
which Jokowi alludes—has been a factor that has affected realized Chinese investments, 
Jusuf Wanandi from the Center of Strategic and International Studies Foundation has also 
stated that “distrust was one of the main obstacles hampering the business relationship 
between Indonesia and China.”167 This perception of distrust would certainly limit the 
trajectory of building closer strategic ties and the future expectation of economic benefits. 
Figure 2.  Foreign Direct Investment into Indonesia from 2010 to 2014 (US$ million).168 
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b. Strengthening the Risk-Contingency Option 
Under Jokowi’s government, there has been an emerging political-military 
consensus of China posing a maritime security threat within Indonesia. This consensus 
has resulted in Jokowi’s government strengthening its internal balancing and soft 
balancing components of its hedging strategy to deal with the increasing Chinese military 
threat. 
From an internal balancing perspective, Jokowi’s government has pledged to 
strengthen its maritime defense force to protect Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty. In his 
speech at the 2014 EAS, Jokowi asserts that “Indonesia is obligated to build its maritime 
defense power. This is necessary not only to secure its maritime wealth and sovereignty 
but also to take responsibility for safeguarding navigation safety and maritime 
security.” 169 Jokowi has also announced that Indonesia’s military buildup will be funded 
through an increased defense budget, which would grow from the current 0.8 percent of 
the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 to 1.5 percent within five years (approximately 
US$20 billion).170 As part of this military buildup, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for 
Politics, Law, and Security, Tedjo Purdijatno, has stated that the increased budget will be 
used to acquire new submarines, patrol vessels, and combat ships.171 
From the soft balancing perspective, Indonesia has sought to pursue a closer 
defense relationship with the United States through the signing of the Indonesia-U.S. 
2015 action plan to expand military cooperation. According to General Ediwan Prabowo 
from Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense, “the focus of cooperation . . . would involve the 
directorate general’s defense strategy, defense planning and its defense potential.”172 
Such comprehensive defense collaboration not only provides greater assurance to 
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Indonesia of the U.S. security commitment in the region, it would also help Indonesia 
build its military capabilities to deal with external security threats. 
Expanding military cooperation with the United States has also included the 
proposed conduct of regular military exercises near Natuna waters. Since 2014, Indonesia 
has hosted Exercise Komodo, a multilateral joint naval exercise that also involves the 
United States, in the Riau Islands province. According to Indonesia Navy spokesman 
Manahan Simorangkir, there are also plans to hold other joint exercises with the United 
States in the Riau Islands province on a more regular basis.173 The conduct of these 
military exercises in the area suggests that Indonesia—in particular the Indonesian 
military elites—have perceived China as a security threat to Indonesia’s sovereignty, and 
one of the reasons for strengthening the Indonesia-U.S. military cooperation is to counter 
China’s growing assertiveness in the SCS dispute. 
c. Signaling of Indonesia’s Resolve to Safeguard Sovereignty 
The most significant policy shift between Yudhoyono’s and Jokowi’s foreign 
policy toward China has been Jokowi’s willingness to take a stronger stance against 
Chinese actions that challenge Indonesia’s national interests. Although Jokowi is aware 
of the potential political repercussions with antagonizing China, he has signaled that 
Indonesia will be willing to take a more assertive response against China in defending its 
maritime sovereignty. Jakarta has already demonstrated this resolve by revoking a 2013 
bilateral agreement with China on fisheries and confiscating and sinking illegal Chinese 
fishing vessels caught in its territorial waters.174 According to RSIS analysts, Indonesian 
officials have also warned Chinese diplomats of more assertive responses if Chinese 
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patrol vessels were to violate Indonesia’s sovereignty or conduct aggressive actions 
against Indonesian vessels in its territorial waters.175 
With regards to the current SCS dispute, Indonesia has also publicly “announced 
that China’s nine-dash line map outlining its claims in the South China Sea overlaps with 
Indonesia’s Riau province, which included the Natuna Island chain”; this was followed 
by President Jokowi’s declaration that China’s nine-dash line claim “has no basis in any 
international law” during a press interview when he visited Tokyo on an official state 
visit.176 Jokowi’s public statement on Indonesia’s position with regards to the SCS 
dispute has been considered significant since this was the first time that an Indonesian 
president has officially clarified Indonesia’s views on the dispute. 
d. Explaining Jokowi’s Hedging Strategy vis-à-vis China 
Although Jokowi has been in office for less than a year, his policy of 
strengthening Indonesia’s military capabilities, pursuing a closer security relationship 
with the United States, and adopting a more assertive stance against China’s challenges to 
Indonesia’s sovereignty suggest that his government is more inclined toward balancing 
China in its hedging strategy than his predecessor. Jokowi’s policy shift is likely to have 
been influenced by the emerging political-military consensus among Indonesian 
policymakers that China is an increasing security threat. These perceptions would have 
been reinforced by China’s recent assertive behaviors in the SCS disputes toward 
Vietnam and Philippines in the SCS dispute, and China’s aggressive actions and 
infringements in Indonesia’s territorial waters.  
Some analysts have also argued that domestic politics have influenced Jokowi’s 
China policy toward the balancing end of the hedging spectrum. According to Aaron 
Connelly, “Jokowi faces a hostile opposition coalition and rebellious members of his own 
party in the legislature, with both sides ready to criticize the new President if he is seen as 
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insufficiently nationalist.”177 In view of the increasing coercive measures by Chinese 
Coastguard vessels in its EEZ, Jokowi has to demonstrate that he would address the 
China threat by adopting a stronger balancing posture in dealing with a more assertive 
China.  
In the longer term, the potential for conflict with China exists in two forms. First, 
if Beijing chooses to continue asserting its nine-dash line claims aggressively and to 
challenge Indonesia’s sovereign territory, an escalation of conflict may be inevitable with 
Jokowi placing the defense of Indonesia’s sovereignty above other interests. Second, if 
China’s regional leadership ambitions include the establishment of a Sino-centric 
regional order, it would certainly create a conflict of interest with Indonesia’s ambition of 
becoming the maritime power in the region and the natural leader of the ASEAN-centric 
community. In view of the likely possibility of these two scenarios, the adjustment of 
Indonesia’s hedging preferences toward the balancing end of the hedging spectrum would 
serve to bolster Jokowi’s commitment of prioritizing Indonesia’s national interests, its 
maritime sovereignty, and ambition of becoming a regional maritime power above all 
other perceived benefits. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Indonesia’s hedging strategy vis-à-vis China reflects the compromise between 
enhancing Indonesia’s future security and pragmatic economic factors. Under 
Yudhoyono’s government, Indonesia has continued to develop closer relations with 
China—despite the persistent wariness of China as a security threat and the uncertainty of 
China’s hegemonic intentions—in order to accrue economic benefits that would help 
expand Indonesia’s under-developed economy. Concurrently, Yudhoyono’s government 
had actively mitigated the potential risk of an escalating China threat through developing 
a close strategic defense partnership with the United States and ensuring a dynamic 
equilibrium of power in the region. 
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Given the increasing perception of threat with China’s rising powers and greater 
assertive behaviors in the region, early indicators suggest that Jokowi’s government has 
shifted closer toward balancing in the hedging spectrum. With Jokowi’s commitment 
toward expanding Indonesia’s maritime defense capabilities, defending Indonesia’s 
maritime sovereignty, and prioritizing Indonesia’s national interests over great power 
relations, it is likely that any conflict of interest with China would be met with a more 
assertive balancing response.  
Nevertheless, despite the increased perception of the China threat, Jokowi 
requires Chinese investments to build up its maritime economy. Given that the core of 
Jokowi’s maritime axis policy is centered on domestic development, Jokowi would 
continue to be pragmatic in pursuing a closer strategic relationship with China for the 
purpose of helping Indonesia achieve its maritime power status in the region. In the 
interim, it is expected that Jokowi’s government would tread carefully in its hedging 
strategy by taking a more proactive approach in strengthening its risk-contingency 
options while cautiously preventing the escalation of tensions in the bilateral relationship 




IV. THAILAND’S CHINA POLICY 
Like Indonesia, Thailand’s perception of China’s rise has been dominated by two 
conflicting perspectives. The first is an optimistic perspective that China is building a 
mutually beneficial economic relationship, presenting opportunities for strategic 
cooperation, and reducing threat perceptions of China’s growing military power. The 
other perspective regards China’s rising powers and the uncertainty of its long-term 
intentions as a strategic concern. Hence, Thailand’s long-standing hedging strategy has 
been to maintain close relationships with China and the United States in order to 
strategically benefit from both sides and to ensure greater policy maneuvering space.  
Despite China’s recent assertiveness and structural pressures to balance China’s 
growing powers, there has been a noticeable shift in Thailand’s hedging preference 
toward greater strategic engagement and accommodation policies with China. This 
chapter examines Thailand’s operationalization of its China hedging strategy since the 
turn of the twenty-first century and explains the recent shifts in Thailand’s hedging 
preferences. This chapter contends that the positive Sino-Thai historical relations and 
Thailand’s optimistic views of China’s rise have contributed to the relatively low 
perception of the China threat; nevertheless, it has been domestic politics that has been 
the key driver of Thailand’s recent shifts in hedging preferences. These evidences support 
the hypothesis that the incumbent Thai ruling elites have sought closer Sino-Thai 
relations to leverage the benefits associated with China’s rise in order to bolster their 
political legitimacy.  
A. 1975–2000: THAILAND-CHINA HISTORICAL RELATIONS  
Since the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1975, the Sino-Thai relationship has 
grown from an initially shaky friendship to strategic partners in the space of fifteen years. 
One of the key events during the Cold War period that helped forge the strategic 
partnership was the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. According to 
Thai scholar Chulacheeb Chinwanno, the Cambodia conflict “brought about a 
convergence of security interests between Thailand and China that resulted in strategic 
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cooperation.”178 Their common interests to drive the Vietnamese forces out of Cambodia 
led to Thailand and China becoming de-facto allies. Consequently, both countries 
developed a comprehensive strategic partnership that covered political, military, and 
economic cooperation: Thailand supported China’s “bleeding Vietnam white” strategy in 
ASEAN forums despite firm opposition by other members, and Bangkok worked closely 
with Beijing to find a diplomatic solution that would end the conflict; a slew of economic 
and trade agreements were signed between 1985 and 1987, which increased bilateral 
trade and investments; and China transferred military weapons to Thailand and concluded 
two arms deals at friendship prices.179 When the Cambodia conflict officially ended with 
the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, Thailand had become China’s closest strategic partner 
in Southeast Asia.  
During the 1990s, Thailand continued to maintain close relations with China even 
though China’s rising material powers, defense modernization, and provocative actions 
had created the perception in other countries of potential Chinese revisionist intentions in 
Southeast Asia. In particular, many ASEAN states viewed China’s aggressive actions 
with apprehension after the Johnson South Reef skirmish with Vietnam in 1988 and the 
occupation of the Mischief Reef in 1995. The firing of missiles into the Taiwan Straits 
during the Taiwan crisis in 1996 further reinforced regional perceptions that China would 
use military force to resolve disputes. Instead of criticizing China’s assertive policies, 
Thailand became China’s interlocutor in ASEAN and encouraged China to partake in 
ASEAN’s multilateral dialogues in order to promote security and stability in the 
region.180  
Concurrently, Thailand pursued a policy of economic engagement to bolster 
bilateral ties. Chinwanno claims that “the majority of Thai leaders perceived the rise of 
China as an opportunity. . . . They believed that economic growth in China should be 
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encouraged not only because it created valuable trade and investment opportunities but 
also because it kept China stable and facilitated its integration into the regional 
community and the world, giving China a stake in the international status quo.”181  
If China’s assertive policies in the SCS disputes had raised any perceived fears of 
China’s revisionist intentions, then Beijing’s overtures during the Asian financial crisis 
would have reassured Thailand’s political elites that China was a status quo power and a 
reliable strategic partner. Beijing’s decisions to provide $1 billion as a bailout package to 
Thailand, extend a $2 billion credit line under the Chiang Mai Initiative, and prevent the 
devaluation of the Yuan helped Thailand to eventually recover from the crisis. Besides 
earning Thai goodwill, China had also demonstrated “a capacity and willingness to 
shoulder the responsibility of a great power in a manner consistent with the status 
quo.”182  
By the start of the twenty-first century, the Sino-Thai relationship had evolved 
into a strategic partnership in which Thailand views China’s rise as an opportunity rather 
than a threat. Ian Storey attributes the evolution of this “special relationship” in the 1990s 
to three key factors: the absence of territorial disputes, Beijing’s financial assistance to 
Thailand during the economic crisis, and the assimilation of “Thailand’s sizeable ethnic 
Chinese community” that has served as a “useful bridge between the two countries.”183 
Thailand became the first Southeast Asian state to sign the “Plan of Action in the 21st 
Century” with China, which aimed to promote a more comprehensive bilateral 
cooperation in the economic, political, military, and security realms.184 This agreement 
formed the basis for Thailand to pursue an even closer Sino-Thai relationship in the 
twenty-first century. 
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B. 2001–2011: THAILAND’S POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH CHINA 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, Thailand and China had developed a close 
relationship through more than two decades of amity and cooperation. At the same time, 
Thai policymakers continued to view U.S. commitments to the region as crucial for 
Thailand’s security and placed an emphasis on balancing Thailand’s relations with both 
the great powers. This section examines the evolving considerations and implementation 
of Thailand’s hedging strategy vis-à-vis China during the time period between 2001 and 
2011.  
1. Strategic Considerations in Thailand’s China Policy 
Thailand’s hedging strategy toward China has been strongly influenced by three 
strategic considerations. First, Thai policymakers viewed China’s rise as an opportunity 
for greater strategic cooperation. In particular, China’s economy was seen as the key 
driver of regional economic growth, and the ruling elites viewed Thailand’s economic 
prosperity as increasingly linked to China’s growing economy. Second, Thai 
policymakers regarded China as a benign power because they have built a long history of 
friendly relations, which have been relatively free of conflicts. In addition, Thailand does 
not have any territorial disputes with China, which reduces the perception of China as a 
security threat.  
Third, although there has been a lack of a direct security threat from China, 
scholars and analysts have pointed to the strategic uncertainty of China’s rising powers as 
a potential concern among Thai policymakers. Goh argues that “long-term strategic 
worries” regarding China’s rise have prevented Thailand from bandwagoning with China 
“in spite of their close relations,” but on the other hand, these worries have also not been 
sufficient to elicit a balancing response.185 Similarly, Denny Roy contends that “while 
Thais are not completely free of suspicions about the possible consequences of a strong 
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China (hence the need for hedging), the current sense of perceived threat appears to be 
minimal.”186 
Given the strategic uncertainties of China’s rise and the ambiguous perception of 
a China threat, both Goh and Roy have agreed that Thailand has pursued a hedging 
strategy of engaging China through economic, strategic, and security cooperation while 
concurrently hedging against a more assertive China through maintaining close defense 
ties with the United States. Such a policy ensures greater policy maneuvering space in the 
event that China becomes a revisionist power, and yet, it continues to allow Thailand to 
maximize the short-term economic benefits associated with China’s rise.  
2. Implementing the Hedging Strategy 
Based on these strategic considerations, Thailand’s hedging strategy consisted of 
increasing its engagements with China while balancing against potential Chinese 
aggression through strengthening the Thai-U.S. alliance relationship. In addition, 
Thailand’s hedging preference was to maintain an equally close relationship with the 
United States and China. From these perspectives, Thailand operationalized its hedging 
strategy through four key policies: economic pragmatism, strategic engagement, limited-
bandwagoning, and indirect balancing. 
a. Economic Pragmatism Policy 
Similar to Indonesia, Thailand’s intent of pursuing a pragmatic economic policy 
were to maximize economic gains in order to facilitate domestic development. In 
addition, establishing closer economic linkages and deeper economic ties raised the 
incentives for China to pursue cooperative and stable relationships at the bilateral and 
regional level. Chinwanno postulated in 2009 that the Thai elites encouraged greater 
economic cooperation “not only because it created valuable trade and investment 
opportunities but also because it kept China stable and facilitated its integration into the 
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regional community and the world, giving China a stake in the international status 
quo.”187 
One of the key ways that Thailand promoted greater economic cooperation in the 
early 2000s was through the establishment of FTAs. At the regional level, Thailand was a 
firm supporter of the ASEAN free trade negotiations with China, which led to the signing 
of the CAFTA framework in 2002. At the same time, Thailand pursued its own 
negotiations and signed the Sino-Thai FTA in 2003, which leveraged on the early harvest 
program linked to the CAFTA.188  
With greater trade and investment ties, China became a major contributor to 
Thailand’s growth after the Asian financial crisis, and Thailand leveraged on China’s 
growing economy for economic gains. In 2000, Thailand’s total trade with China 
amounted to US$6.18 billion, accounting for 4.7 percent of Thailand’s total imports and 
exports. By 2010, Thailand’s trade with China increased to US$45.71 billion, accounting 
for 12.1 percent of Thailand’s total trade.189 China rose from being Thailand’s fourth 
largest trading partner in 2000 to become Thailand’s second largest trading partner in 
2010. Chinese foreign direct investments in Thailand increased from US$11.5 million in 
2005 to a high of US$706 million in 2010.190 An economic pragmatic policy enabled 
Thailand to develop closer trade and investment ties with China, which significantly 
contributed to Thailand’s economic growth and development. 
While growing economic ties and the Sino-Thai FTA presented huge 
opportunities for Thailand to stimulate its economic growth, there were concerns of 
China as an economic threat. The opening up of China’s economy diverted foreign direct 
investments away from Thailand, and the Thai domestic manufacturers were not able to 
compete with the low-cost Chinese manufacturers. The FTA also permitted Chinese 
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goods to flood Thailand’s markets, but non-tariff barriers on the Chinese side prevented 
the free flow of Thai goods to China markets. The agricultural early harvest provisions in 
the Sino-Thai FTA led to the economic hardship of rural farming households who were 
not able to compete with the cheap agricultural Chinese produces.191 Despite the 
economic challenges and competition between Thailand and China, Thai policymakers 
downplayed these perceived “short-term” concerns and evinced a positive outlook that 
“Thailand will be able to adjust to potential Chinese economic competition as its 
industries are forced to find niches in the market or to move up the value chain in 
production.”192 
b. Strategic Engagement Policy 
From 2001 to 2011, Thailand sought closer strategic engagements through three 
key channels: conducting frequent high-level meetings, signing of bilateral agreements to 
expand multi-dimensional engagements with China, and pursuing closer military-security 
cooperation. 
First, official state visits to China were always high on the priority list for 
Thailand’s newly appointed prime ministers, reflecting the importance of the Sino-Thai 
relationship. These visits often resulted in the discussion or signing of bilateral 
cooperation agreements (see Table 9). In reciprocation, China’s president, premier, or 
foreign minister visited Bangkok at least once a year to hold discussions on strategic 
cooperation. Thaksin aptly described the warm Sino-Thai relationship during the thirtieth 
anniversary of Sino-Thai diplomatic ties when he declared that “Thailand and China are 
like brothers.”193 
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Table 9.   Thai Prime Ministers’ State Visits to China (2001–2011).194 
Appointment Prime Minister Visit to China Agreements / Achievements 
Feb 1—Sep 6 Thaksin Shinawatra 
Aug / Oct 2001, 
Feb 2003, Feb 
2004, Jul 2005 
2001: Issue of Joint Communique 
2003: Discussion on Sino-Thai FTA (signed 
Jun 3) 
2005: Amended Agreement of Sino-Thai FTA, 
Celebration of 30th Anniversary of Diplomatic 
Ties 
Oct 6—Jan 8 Surayud Chulanont May 2007 
2007: Joint Action Plan on Sino-Thai Strategic 
Cooperation 
Jan 8—Sep 8 Samak Sundaravej Jun 2008 2008: Signed contracts worth US$400 million 
Dec 8—Aug 11 Abhisit Vejjajiva 
Jun 2009, Sep 
2010 
2009: Signed three Agreements: (1) Protocol 
on Inspection and Quarantine Requirements for 
Thai Fruit Exports from Thailand to China, (2) 
Agreement on Expanding and Deepening 
Bilateral and Economic Trade Cooperation, (3) 
Agreement on Education Cooperation 
 
Second, Thailand followed up with a series of key agreements to promote a multi-
dimensional strategic engagement with China. In August 2001, China and Thailand 
issued a joint communique during Thaksin’s China visit to consolidate the strategic Sino-
Thai partnership and promote greater strategic cooperation. Subsequent negotiations to 
expand Sino-Thai strategic cooperation led to the implementation of the 2007 Joint 
Action Plan, which identified fifteen areas of cooperation that span the economic, 
political, military-security, cultural, and social realms. These agreements helped to forge 
closer bilateral relations, foster mutually beneficial cooperation, and promote common 
developments. 
The third channel of strategic cooperation pursued by both countries was focused 
on the military-security realm. In 2001, Thailand became the first ASEAN country to 
institutionalize military relations by holding annual high-level defense and security 
dialogues with China. In 2005, the first joint naval exercise, codenamed China-Thailand 
Friendship 2005, was conducted off the Gulf of Thailand. The commitment to defense 
and military cooperation was further enhanced through the signing of the 2007 Joint 
Action Plan, which called for greater military exercises to cooperate on countering non-
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traditional security threats and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). The 
first such exercise, codenamed Strike 2007, involved Special Forces from both sides. The 
counter-terrorism exercises were conducted again in 2008 and 2010.195 Through these 
means, Thailand’s military diplomacy served to enhance mutual trust between the two 
countries. 
In addition, military cooperation resulted in Thailand looking to China for arms 
purchases. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
Thailand was the second largest Chinese arms buyer in Southeast Asia between 2000 and 
2010.196 Thai purchases of Chinese military equipment have to be viewed from a 
political angle rather than a military one: the purchases of significant Chinese arms, such 
as the rocket-propelled grenade launchers in 2001 and the $98 million order for two 
patrol vessels in 2002, were initiated when Thaksin was pursuing a closer strategic 
engagement with China. Similarly, the purchase of Chinese C-802 anti-ship missiles 
worth $48 million was paid for using Chinese military credits extended to Thailand after 
the United States suspended Thailand’s military aid in the aftermath of the 2006 military 
coup.197 
Nevertheless, there were limitations on establishing closer military ties with 
China because Thailand had to take into consideration its long-standing security alliance 
with the United States. According to Storey, Thailand was cautious of “balancing 
relations between the United States and China”; while Thailand desired to increase 
military exercises with China, it was also sensitive to potential U.S. concerns of 
conducting conventional joint exercises with China because it would expose American 
tactics and weapon capabilities to the PLA.198 Therefore, when China proposed to 
conduct a joint amphibious landing exercise in 2009, Storey argues that the Thai 
government was cautious to limit the scale and scope of the exercise.199 As a 
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consequence, Sino-Thai military exercises were often symbolic and act as confidence 
building measures, rather than to increase interoperability and professional training 
between the two militaries. 
c. Limited-Bandwagoning Policy 
The policy of limited bandwagoning refers to a state’s political partnership with a 
rising great power through “policy coordination on selective issues” or “voluntary 
deference given to the larger partner” in the hope of securing present gains or future 
rewards.200 From this perspective, Thailand has shown great deference to China on 
political issues such the Falun Gong movement, Taiwan, and Tibet. In 2001 and 2003, 
Thaksin’s government ceded to Beijing’s request to curb the activities and meetings of 
the Falun Gong in Thailand.201 The Thai government pledged allegiance to the One 
China policy, and it demonstrated its allegiance in 2003 when the foreign ministry 
withdrew the visas to Taiwanese legislators before a high-level Chinese official was due 
to visit Bangkok.202 The Thai government also repeatedly denied visas to the Dalai Lama 
and his immediate family. In addition, the Thai foreign ministry, at the request of Beijing, 
intervened in 2010 to scale down a Tibetan cultural event held in Bangkok. Thailand’s 
foreign ministry justified its actions by claiming that the government reserved the right 
“to reject any politically related issue which might affect good relations with another 
country.” 203  
Thailand’s limited-bandwagoning behavior toward China was also witnessed in 
ASEAN institutions. Thailand never raised objections to China’s uncooperative attitude 
in the South China Sea disputes unlike some other ASEAN members. During Thailand’s 
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chairmanship of ASEAN from 2008 to 2009, it avoided placing the dispute on the 
agenda. In addition, Thai elites also viewed Beijing as a partner in pushing for common 
foreign policy goals. An often cited example is the collaboration between Thailand and 
China to launch the Asian Cooperation Dialogue in 2002. According to Kavi 
Chongkittavorn, Thailand’s accommodation toward China led Chinese leaders to view 
Thailand as a “reliable ASEAN voice with predictable views and positions on China,” 
which is usually oriented toward China interests.204 
d. Indirect Balancing Policy 
Indirect balancing is a policy “undertaken by individual states unilaterally or 
bilaterally, aimed at deterring a range of potential threats.”205 Thailand’s indirect 
balancing policy aims to ensure the continued U.S. military presence in the region to act 
as deterrence against potential military threats. According to Goh, “these balancing 
policies are indirect, because they ‘borrow’ U.S. military power, are not explicitly 
targeted against specific Chinese military threats, and are often undertaken in the name of 
other types of security interests shared with the United States.”206  
Thailand pursued an indirect balancing policy by strengthening its close defense 
relationship with the United States, which resulted in Thailand being recognized as a 
major non-NATO ally in 2003. Thailand counterbalanced its growing engagements with 
China by strengthening the U.S.-Thai relations through three ways. First, Thailand 
supported the U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq by providing logistical support, 
opening Utapao airbase to American aircraft for refueling, and sending military personnel 
to assist with the reconstruction efforts from 2003 to 2004. Second, Thailand hosted 
numerous joint military exercises together with the United States, including the annual 
Cobra Gold exercise that has become the largest multilateral exercise in Asia. Third, 
strategic cooperation was institutionalized through the conduct of the U.S.-Thailand 
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Strategic Dialogue and the U.S.-Thailand Strategic Defense Talks, which fostered close 
defense and security cooperation.207 
Although observers have assumed Thailand’s designation as a major non-NATO 
ally points to an external-balancing strategy against China, three key pieces of evidence 
contradict this hard-balancing perception. First, the origin of the U.S.-Thai alliance was a 
legacy of the Cold War era to deal with communism. The Thai-U.S. alliance, unlike the 
Japan-U.S. alliance, was not updated after the Cold War to guard against Thailand’s 
perceived security threats, despite the many opportunities for the Thai government to do 
so. Second, Thailand viewed the alliance as a means to anchor U.S. commitments in the 
region to enhance security stability, rather than to target a specific China threat. As Goh 
points out, Thai officials have been “particularly careful to explain that these 
commitments are not geared toward China per se; instead they are seen as an important 
means of facilitating continued American interest and engagement in the region” as a 
form of “psychological reassurance.”208 Third, Thailand was designated as a major non-
NATO ally because of its contributions toward the U.S. war on terrorism and 
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the rise of terrorism in 
Southeast Asia places Thailand as a pivotal state in the war against terrorism; hence, the 
elevation of Thailand to a non-NATO ally would allow the United States to provide 
Thailand with the necessary military assistance and aid to deal with non-traditional 
security threats.209  
C. 2012–2015: THAILAND’S POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH CHINA  
Since 2012, Thailand has shifted its hedging preference toward greater strategic 
engagement and bandwagoning with China. Based on the balance of power perspective, 
the structural changes in the form of China’s growing powers and Beijing’s assertive 
policies in the region (as discussed in Chapter II) should have encouraged Thailand to 
adopt a stronger balancing policy in its hedging strategy. In addition, a balancing policy 
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could have been easily adopted given that its traditional ally, the United States, was 
actively seeking deeper strategic cooperation to counterbalance China’s rise. Instead, 
Thailand has adopted a hedging strategy oriented toward greater strategic engagement 
and bandwagoning with China in order to enhance greater economic and political 
benefits, rather than to minimize the potential security risks associated with China’s rise. 
In order to understand Thailand’s hedging behaviors since 2012, the intervening 
role of domestic politics has to be considered. At the domestic level, Yingluck’s Peua 
Thai Party (PTP) won the July 2011 elections and adopted an accommodative China 
strategy focused on commerce-centric policies. Political in-fighting eventually led to 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha seizing power through a coup in May 2014 and establishing a 
military government. In order to understand Thailand’s hedging behaviors since 2011, the 
intervening role of domestic politics has to be considered. The political instability in 
Thailand had a greater effect on Sino-Thai relations than structural changes in the 
regional geopolitical landscape as the incumbent Thai ruling elites downplayed the 
security concerns and threat perceptions of China’s rise in order to leverage on the 
benefits associated with China’s rise, so that the Thai elites could enhance their political 
legitimacy at home.      
1. Yingluck’s PTP Government: Upgrading the Sino-Thai Relationship 
Under Yingluck’s government, Thai policymakers viewed China as pivotal to 
Thailand’s strategy in coping with its domestic and regional challenges. During a closed-
door session held in March 2012, Kavi Chongkittavorn reports that participants from the 
various government ministries, private sector, and academia “agreed unanimously that 
Thailand must look beyond the U.S. alliance, which was more advantageous during the 
Cold War, and strengthen engagement with China.”210 The importance of China as a 
strategic partner has driven Thailand to upgrade their bilateral relations to a 
“comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” during Yingluck’s visit to Beijing in 
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April 2012.211 Two five-year action plans, covering strategic and economic bilateral 
cooperation, were signed to enhance the strategic partnership between the two countries.  
China’s increasing importance as a strategic partner to Yingluck’s government 
was also evident from Thailand’s economic data: bilateral trade increased from US$45.71 
billion in 2011 to US$64.96 billion in 2013, accounting for 13.6 percent of Thailand’s 
total trade; China was Thailand’s second largest foreign investor in 2012 and 2013; and 
China overtook Japan as Thailand’s largest trade partner in 2013.212 In pursuing further 
economic and financial cooperation, both countries signed a 325 billion baht currency 
swap deal that would increase bilateral trade.213 With China’s increasing importance to 
Thailand’s economy, Yingluck’s government viewed China as instrumental in ensuring 
Thailand’s continued economic growth.  
A close Chinese relation was also important to Yingluck’s government because 
Beijing indirectly supported some of the populist policies implemented during Yingluck’s 
term. A notable example was China’s agreement to buy the huge stockpiles of rice that 
have built up due to Yingluck’s populist rice-pledging scheme. Despite having sufficient 
supply of rice domestically, Beijing offered to purchase one million tons of rice a year 
from Thailand through Chinese firms and an undisclosed amount through a government-
to-government deal.214 
In addition, Chinese investment was perceived to be important in developing the 
transport infrastructure required for developing Thailand’s rural north and northeast 
provinces, which has been the political support base for Yingluck’s party. Beijing signed 
agreements with Yingluck’s government to invest in building up Thailand’s train and 
water infrastructure. In return, Thailand supported China’s Maritime Silk Road and AIIB 
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initiatives, which would provide the much-needed infrastructure funds to meet Thailand’s 
developmental requirements.  
In pursuing a more comprehensive cooperation, Yingluck’s government also 
enhanced defense cooperation and military-to-military relations. After Yingluck’s first 
state visit to Beijing in April 2014, Thailand’s defense minister and all the military 
service chiefs visited Beijing, which, according to Storey, was the “highest ranking Thai 
defense delegation to visit China in 15 years.”215 During the visit, both countries agreed 
to hold their first combined military exercise involving both Royal Thai and PLA Air 
Forces. This agreement was considered a breakthrough in defense cooperation because 
the Thai military has traditionally been reluctant to hold conventional military exercises 
in the past due to potential U.S. objections. In addition, both ministers discussed the 
possible acquisition of Chinese submarines at friendship prices, which is an indicator of 
potential political alignment. The purchase of Chinese submarines would be a deviation 
from Thailand’s previous preferences of not buying high-end defense equipment from 
China—despite the friendship prices—due to the perceived inferior quality of Chinese 
military equipment.216 
With regards to the U.S. strategic pivot announced in 2010, Yingluck’s 
government was ambivalent toward the U.S strategy and became reticent in dealing with 
any request that involved the stationing of American assets in Thailand bases for fear of 
straining bilateral ties with China. In 2012, the United States made two separate requests 
to use Utapao airbase: the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
requested the use of the airbase for its research aircraft to conduct regional climate 
studies, and the Pentagon requested to use the airbase for supporting HADR missions in 
the region. According to Kitti Prasirtsuk, Thai policymakers viewed these requests as part 
of the U.S. strategic pivot to increase its military footprints and to balance against China. 
The reluctance to antagonize China, coupled with fierce debates led by the opposition 
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parties against the U.S. requests, forced Yingluck’s government to defer these 
requests.217 
Thailand’s ambivalence toward the announced U.S. strategic pivot suggests a 
China-oriented Thai foreign policy. However, there were two perspectives to this 
ambivalence: On the one hand, Yingluck’s government continued to view the U.S. 
presence in the region as essential for regional stability and prosperity, and the Thai-U.S. 
alliance was crucial in helping Thailand to deal with non-traditional security challenges. 
Therefore, Yingluck’s government continued to pursue a close relationship with the 
United States as seen through the “2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense 
Alliance” and the Joint Statement issued during President Obama’s visit to Thailand in 
November 2012.218  
On the other hand, although Thailand is an ally to the United States, Graham 
asserts that “Thai observers have prevailing negative opinions of the implications of the 
rebalance strategy,” which has been viewed as “a battlefield for alliance and partnership 
cultivation.”219 From Thailand’s past experiences, the United States had not been a 
reliable partner in providing unwavering support when Thailand was dealing with the 
Cambodian crisis in 1978, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and its political crisis in 
2006. Given the uncertainty of the U.S. commitment and with China replacing the United 
States as the most important strategic and economic partner in the region, Yingluck’s 
government was reluctant to forego the domestic benefits associated with close Sino-Thai 
relations in favor of strengthening the Thai-U.S. relations. As a consequence, Yingluck’s 
government prioritized a China-oriented foreign policy over closer Thai-U.S. security 
relations.  
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2. Prayuth’s Government: Moving toward Bandwagoning with China 
If Yingluck’s foreign policy has been perceived as the beginning of a China-
oriented hedging preference, then the military coup in May 2014 has accelerated 
Thailand’s recalibration of its hedging strategy toward greater bandwagoning with China. 
With the downgrade of the Thai-U.S. relations and the suspension of trade negotiations 
with the West following the coup, Prayuth’s government has embraced increasing 
bilateral cooperation with China in order to gain economic and political benefits. It has 
also sought to develop intimate ties with China—a bilateral relation that Thai Foreign 
Minister General Tanasak Patimapragorn declares as a lover’s relationship.220   
From an economic perspective, Prayuth’s government has been compelled to 
strengthen trade and investments with China in order to deliver on economic reforms and 
boost economic growth. With Thailand’s annual economic growth rate reduced to 0.5 
percent due to the political turmoil in 2014, Prayuth has downplayed the potential 
concerns of Thailand’s over-dependence on China and has chosen to adopt a pro-China 
economic policy. The boosting of ties with China has secured significant economic 
benefits. In December 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang met with Prayuth in Bangkok 
and signed several bilateral agreements. Of significance was the deal to double China’s 
imports of agricultural goods (like rubber and rice) and the pledge to buy two million 
tons of rice. In addition, China signed an agreement worth US$12 billion to jointly 
develop Thailand’s train infrastructure.221 
Besides the economic benefits, the bilateral agreements have politically benefited 
the military government by helping to meet some of the financial commitments it has 
made since seizing power. In order to secure political legitimacy, Prayuth’s government 
had ordered the distribution of funds to pay the rice farmers who were owed money by 
Yingluck’s government under the rice-subsidy scheme. In addition, Prayuth had pledged 
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almost 40 percent of Thailand’s 2014 fiscal budget toward development projects in the 
rural provinces.222 With the bilateral agreements, Thailand would be able to sell off the 
rice stockpile, generate some cash flow to repay the rice farmers, and gain financial 
assistance to develop the country’s transport infrastructure that would benefit the rural 
provinces.  
Under Prayuth’s government, the strengthening of military, defense, and security 
cooperation with China has received substantial focus, and it comes at a time when the 
Thai-U.S. defense cooperation has stalled after the military government took over. 
During the Chinese defense minister’s visit to Bangkok in February 2015 and Thailand’s 
defense minister’s reciprocal visit to Beijing in April 2015, both sides finalized the 
planning for the first joint air exercise and agreed to further expand their current joint 
military exercises. On defense cooperation, China has agreed to explore joint arms 
development and expand the proposed sales of high-end military equipment at friendship 
prices. On security cooperation, both parties agreed to enhance mechanisms to share 
intelligence and to deal with non-traditional security threats.223   
The rapid progress in military, defense, and security cooperation points to the 
possibility of the Thai military government seeking to establish a new form of Sino-Thai 
security relationship that could potentially rival the Thai-U.S. alliance, which has 
traditionally been the cornerstone of Thailand’s security policy. Thai policymakers have 
expressed greater interests toward furthering cooperation with China vis-à-vis the U.S.; in 
the draft of the “National Security Strategy 2015–2021” developed by the National 
Security Council, Thailand wants to “maximize its relations with rising China in all areas 
[rather than the U.S.] as ‘Thailand and China do not have territorial and national conflicts 
at all.’”224 
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Thailand’s political accommodation and bandwagoning with China is also evident 
from other recent events, such as Bangkok’s repatriation of over 100 Uighur people to 
China in July 2015. While Thailand has not been the only country that recently deported 
Uighur refugees back to China, it was the large numbers of deportation that elicited a 
backlash—from the United States, Turkey, and international human rights 
organizations—criticizing Thailand’s acquiescence to China’s demand “for reasons of 
realpolitik.”225 Although Prayuth defended his decision by stating that the government 
ensured that only Uighur refugees with Chinese citizenships were repatriated after a long 
decision-making process, he had also made known in press statements that Thailand did 
not want to destroy the relationship with China over the Uighur issue.226 
Nevertheless, Thailand has diversified its hedging policy by seeking deeper 
bilateral ties with other major powers. Since 2013, Thailand has established a strategic 
partnership agreement with Japan and India, and initiated talks with Moscow to upgrade 
the Thailand-Russia relations to a strategic partnership.227 Prayuth’s government has 
continued this diversification strategy by seeking to strengthen relations with Japan and 
India. Thailand and Russia have also rekindled their strategic relationship through signing 
a slew of bilateral agreements covering economic and security cooperation when Russian 
Minister Medvedev visited Bangkok in April 2015. Thailand’s pursuit of deepening 
strategic relations with other major powers serves as a “dominance-denial” policy in a 
hedging strategy. According to Kuik, such a policy aims to prevent China as a rising 
great power from exerting undue influence on smaller states like Thailand.228 Therefore, 
through seeking deeper bilateral ties with other major powers, Prayuth’s government has 
sought to maintain a more balanced relationship with China and other major powers to 
provide some resilience against China exerting undue interference on Thailand and to 
provide Thailand with greater policy options. 
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With the proposed elections being pushed back to 2016, Prayuth has to maintain 
his political legitimacy through increasing economic growth, finding new markets for 
Thailand’s agricultural goods, and seeking support of the rural populations through 
economic development policies and infrastructure building. Pursuing a closer alignment 
with China and strengthening Thailand’s strategic relations with other major powers 
would continue to be Prayuth’s hedging preference as long as U.S. policy restrictions 
toward the military government are not lifted.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Hedging has continued to be Thailand’s main strategy in coping with China’s 
growing powers and influence in the region. Nonetheless, Thailand’s hedging preferences 
have shifted in accordance with domestic considerations. Under Yingluck’s government, 
the low perception of a China threat and the expected gains of a closer relation with 
China have encouraged Thailand to prioritize economic and strategic engagement with 
China in order to increase the political legitimacy of the ruling government. Under 
Prayuth’s government, Thailand has strategically aligned itself with China because 
Beijing’s strong political and economic support provided Prayuth’s regime with the 
means to bolster his political legitimacy at home. With Prayuth still in power, Sino-Thai 
relations would continue to deepen based on these perceived political and economic 
benefits. 
With China having overtaken the United States as Thailand’s most important 
strategic partner, it is unlikely that Thailand would go back to the status quo of 
maintaining an equidistant relationship between the two great powers even after Thai-
U.S. relations are restored in the future. Assuming that China does not exhibit any 
security threat to Thailand, it is more plausible that Thailand’s future hedging preference 
would continue to be more accommodative of China’s interests as it seeks to maximize 





Beijing’s adjustment of its peaceful development policy since 2012 has generated 
different policy responses from Indonesia and Thailand. For Indonesia, Xi’s policy of a 
more proactive and assertive approach—in shaping the regional environment and 
safeguarding China’s national interests—has generated an increasing perception of threat 
and greater strategic uncertainty about China’s rise among Indonesian elites. Even though 
China’s increasingly proactive engagement of the region has brought about greater 
expectation of benefits to Indonesia, these perceived benefits have not been sufficient to 
mitigate the security concerns of a potential China challenge to Indonesia’s sovereignty. 
As a result, Indonesia has been more inclined to move toward the balancing end of the 
hedging spectrum, which is evident from its increasing emphasis in building up its 
military capabilities and strengthening its defense relationship with the United States (see 
Figure 3). 
Figure 3.  Indonesia’s Shift in Hedging Posture toward China 
 
 
In contrast, Thailand has moved toward the bandwagoning end of the hedging 
spectrum (see Figure 4). Although structural changes in the form of China’s rising 
powers and increasing assertiveness in the region should have increased the perception of 
the China threat, the ruling elites in Yingluck’s and Prayuth’s government have focused 
instead on the tremendous benefits that a closer Sino-Thai relationship would bring to 
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Thailand. With Beijing proactively reaching out within Southeast Asia to enhance win-
win cooperation and develop deeper strategic relations, Thailand has reciprocated by 
seeking closer strategic Sino-Thai engagement to benefit from China’s continued rise. 
Figure 4.  Thailand’s Shift in Hedging Posture toward China 
 
 
The different strategic considerations of Indonesia’s and Thailand’s responses to 
China’s policy shifts also highlight that structural changes alone do not account for a 
state’s policy choices: domestic factors do exert an intervening effect on policy outcomes 
to different extents. The following sections examine the geopolitical and domestic 
political factors that have shaped Indonesia’s and Thailand’s hedging preferences.  
A. ANALYSIS OF THE SHIFTS IN INDONESIA’S CHINA POLICY 
The different hedging preferences between Yudhoyono’s government and 
Jokowi’s government warrant greater analysis in understanding the shift in policy 
behaviors between the two governments. While geopolitical factors have reinforced the 
increased perception of threat since 2012, domestic political factors seem to be the 
intervening variable that has incentivized Jokowi’s government to implement a more 
assertive stance against China and adopt a hedging strategy that leans toward balancing.  
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1. Geopolitical Factors: Reinforcing the China Threat Perception 
From the geopolitical perspective, Indonesia’s increased perception of the China 
threat since 2012 may be attributed to four factors. First, China’s historical nine-dash line 
claim and its overlap with Indonesia’s EEZ continue to be unresolved; this has led to 
escalating incidents of Chinese paramilitary vessels harassing Indonesian patrol vessels 
and preventing them from arresting Chinese-registered boats fishing illegally within 
Indonesia’s territorial waters. In addition, with President Xi asserting that China will 
“firmly uphold China’s maritime rights and interests” and “continue to improve [China’s] 
capacity to provide such protection,” Indonesia is worried that China would act even 
more belligerently toward Indonesia in upholding China’s maritime claims as the PLA 
continues to expand and modernize its naval capabilities.229  
Second, as an archipelagic state, Indonesia views the growing tensions in the SCS 
caused by China’s belligerent actions as a significant threat to its security. Given that the 
SCS is contiguous with Indonesia’s territorial waters, any militarized conflict in the SCS 
would disrupt Indonesia’s economic trade and affect Indonesia’s maritime security. 
Third, even if China and Indonesia continue to maintain that there are no maritime 
disputes between the two countries, Indonesia would still view China’s aggressive actions 
in the current SCS dispute with trepidation, especially if China’s current actions are 
indicative of its future behavior as a great power and how it deals with conflicts of 
interests in the region. If China is willing to utilize strong-arm tactics to bully smaller 
states into submission, Indonesian policymakers would certainly be worried that China 
would also use similar tactics to resolve any conflicts of interests with Indonesia.  
Fourth, there remains the strategic uncertainty about China’s regional ambitions 
and whether it will seek to create a Sino-centric regional order. As Southeast Asia’s 
largest power and natural leader of ASEAN, Storey asserts that “Indonesia will continue 
to regard itself as the country destined to lead Southeast Asia into the twenty-first 
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century.”230 China’s regional leadership ambitions would certainly result in a greater 
likelihood of competition with Indonesia for geopolitical influence in Southeast Asia. 
Indonesia would view any attempts by China to revise the status quo regional order with 
great concern, and it will strive to maintain a balance of power to ensure its independence 
as a middle power in the region.  
2. Rising Nationalism: The Incentive to Balance 
Although geopolitical factors may explain why Indonesian elites view China as an 
increasing security threat, it does not adequately address why Yudhoyono chose to adhere 
to his foreign policy of “million friends and zero enemies” rather than responding with 
greater assertiveness in defending Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty. Although there have 
been repeated demands—especially from military circles—to respond to China’s 
encroachment with stronger measures, Yudhoyono had resisted demands from within his 
government to take a harder line against China.  
The likely reason for Yudhoyono’s conciliatory approach toward China is the 
potential economic benefits to be gained from China’s rise. Despite the economic 
challenges associated with the implementation of CAFTA, growing bilateral trade and 
investments have contributed to Indonesia’s rising economic performance in the past 
decade. Hence, Yudhoyono cautiously avoided portraying China as a possible security or 
economic threat so that Indonesia would be able to establish closer bilateral ties and 
benefit economically from increasing mutual cooperation.     
Despite downplaying the portrayal of the China threat, Yudhoyono was astute 
enough to recognize that Indonesia would need to hedge against China’s rising powers in 
order to mitigate the potential security risks of China as a revisionist power. During 
Yudhoyono’s presidential term, his “million friends and zero enemies” foreign policy 
built warm relations with major Asia-Pacific powers, which enabled Indonesia to 
maintain a balance of power in the region. In addition, Yudhoyono started to accord 
greater priority toward defense spending in order to modernize Indonesia’s air and naval 
military capabilities to deal with the potential Chinese military threat. 
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Although Indonesia benefited from China’s expanding economy, Connelly 
contends that Yudhoyono’s foreign policy faced strong criticisms within his government 
because his policy agenda “sacrificed Indonesia’s interests in favor of friendly relations 
with other world leaders.”231 In the face of rising nationalist sentiments in Indonesia, 
Yudhoyono’s weak responses to China’s encroachments into Indonesian waters were 
heavily criticized. It is within this context of rising nationalism that Jokowi has had to 
deal with China’s challenge to Indonesia’s national interests. 
Under Jokowi’s government, Indonesia’s policy focus has shifted toward placing 
Indonesia’s national interests as the utmost priority. With the focus on protecting 
Indonesia’s maritime resources and territorial sovereignty, Indonesia has viewed China’s 
encroachment into its maritime sovereignty as a threat that required an assertive response. 
China’s threat to Indonesia’s sovereignty and the failure of Jokowi’s government to 
respond assertively would certainly undermine his policy of building Indonesia into a 
respected maritime power in the region.  
In addition, rising nationalism and domestic party politics have placed pressure on 
Jokowi to deliver on his pledges of safeguarding Indonesia’s maritime resources and 
sovereignty. If Jokowi is seen to be too soft in addressing China’s disregard for 
Indonesia’s sovereignty, he would face significant political backlash within his party and 
from the opposition coalition. With rising nationalism playing a part in dictating 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, it is clearly in Jokowi’s interest to seek stronger balancing 
measures in order to mitigate the China threat. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE SHIFTS IN THAILAND’S CHINA POLICY 
In contrast to Indonesia, Thailand faces a different set of geopolitical and 
domestic circumstances. From a geopolitical perspective, Thailand has viewed China’s 
rise more positively than Indonesia. From a domestic political perspective, the incumbent 
ruling party’s desire to bolster its political legitimacy in the midst of political in-fighting 
has incentivized Thailand’s ruling elites to lean toward bandwagoning.  
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1. Geopolitical Factors: Reducing the China Threat Perception 
Thailand’s lower perception of the China threat compared to Indonesia can be 
attributed to two key factors: Thailand does not have any common borders or major 
territorial disputes with China, and China’s aggressive actions in the SCS have few 
negative effects on Sino-Thai relations since Thailand does not have a direct security 
interest in the SCS. Instead, China’s charm diplomacy and political, economic, and 
military support for Thailand over the years have reinforced a positive perception of 
China’s current rise in spite of Beijing’s recent assertiveness in the SCS dispute. 
Even if Thai ruling elites remain wary of China’s potential revisionist ambitions, 
they have tended to downplay these security concerns and adopt a pragmatic approach in 
dealing with China due to geopolitical considerations. As a small mainland state in close 
proximity to China, Thailand has been conscious of China’s rising power, and it has 
adapted to China’s inevitable rise by deepening its long-standing strategic partnership 
with China. As long as China does not pose an existential threat to Thailand’s survival, 
Thai elites recognize that a policy of strategic engagement and accommodation, which 
facilitate the convergence of interests and mutual cooperation, would best serve 
Thailand’s national interests in the long term.  
In addition, with Thailand’s economy becoming increasingly integrated with 
China’s growing economy, it would also be reasonable to assume that China’s political 
influence over Thailand has also increased. In fact, many analysts had predicted in the 
mid-2000s that Thailand would lean toward bandwagoning with China. For example, 
David Fullbrook anticipated that “as trade and investment grow, China’s economic 
gravity will wrest Thailand from a century of Western embrace.”232 Similarly, China 
analyst Bronson Percival postulated that Thailand would align closer to China in order to 
“reap the benefits of an emerging Sino-centric order.”233 Therefore, strategically and 
economically speaking, downplaying the security concerns in favor of greater 
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engagement would be a more pragmatic approach toward accommodating China’s rise in 
the region. 
2. Political Legitimization: The Incentive to Bandwagon 
Although geopolitical factors favor a hedging policy orientated toward 
bandwagoning, it is domestic politics that have been the key driver of Thailand’s recent 
shifts in hedging preferences. Yingluck’s government viewed China as instrumental in 
ensuring Thailand’s continued economic growth, which, in turn, was crucial toward 
supporting many of the populist policies implemented during her term. For Prayuth’s 
government, given the way his government came to power, the military ruling elites have 
been compelled to strengthen the Sino-Thai economic relations to deliver on the 
promised reforms and to bolster economic growth in order to strengthen their own 
legitimacy. Furthermore, with the Western democratic countries such as the United States 
and the European Union refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Prayuth’s government 
and downgrading their relations, the military elites’ alignment with a supportive China 
has bolstered their political legitimacy, at least in the short term.  
Thailand’s downplaying of the potential China threat in exchange for the 
expectation of economic and political gains supports the hypothesis that domestic 
legitimization is a key intervening factor in Thailand’s hedging preferences and policy 
choices. As Kuik has asserted, “a country’s key foreign policy decision (e.g., towards a 
rising power) is often a product of domestic legitimization, a process through which the 
ruling elite seeks to act in a way that conforms to the bases of its domestic legitimacy 
with the ultimate end of enhancing its authority and capacity to govern.”234 Yingluck’s 
and Prayuth’s governments adopted hedging strategies oriented toward greater strategic 
engagement and bandwagoning with China in order to maximize the returns of economic 
and political benefits. These hedging shifts were the result of the ruling elites’ 
prioritization of benefits over security concerns associated with China’s rise in order to 
enhance their political legitimacy at home. 
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C. THE EFFECTS OF THE U.S. FACTOR IN HEDGING 
A potential variable not addressed in this thesis is the role of the United States in 
Indonesia’s and Thailand’s hedging strategy. It has been widely acknowledged that the 
United States is Southeast Asia’s security guarantor against China’s potentially 
revisionist ambitions; hence, the U.S. relationship is possibly an important factor in the 
effectiveness of hedging against China and the shaping of a country’s hedging 
preference. The importance of the U.S. factor has been a subject of previous studies. For 
example, Jae Ho Chung explored the correlation between East Asia’s responses to 
China’s rise and the effect of the “U.S. alliance” variable in shaping these responses. He 
concluded that “the alliance variable is particularly powerful: that is, a status change from 
a non-ally to a semi-ally would reduce a nation’s probability of belonging to 
bandwagoners by 32.2 percent. Similarly, a change from an ally to a semi-ally would 
reduce a nation’s probability of belonging to balancers by 34.9 percent.”235 
In the context of Indonesia and Thailand, their policy responses also point to a 
possible correlation between the statuses of their U.S. relationships vis-à-vis their 
hedging preferences. For Thailand, the downgrade of Thai-U.S. relations as a response to 
the military coup in 2014 has clearly pushed Prayuth’s government toward aligning with 
China in order to gain political support, economic assistance, and defense and security 
cooperation. For Indonesia, this correlation is less clear-cut. A strengthening security 
partnership between Indonesia and the United States has clearly assisted Indonesia with 
pursuing an internal balancing policy through military modernization and a soft-
balancing policy that seeks to maintain a balance of power in the region. However, as 
argued in the previous section, Jokowi’s inclination to lean toward balancing in the 
hedging spectrum is also strongly influenced by domestic politics. Further research would 
be needed to validate the correlation between the “U.S. alliance” variable and the hedging 
responses of Indonesia and Thailand, especially if China’s policy toward Southeast Asia 
shifts toward greater assertiveness in areas other than the SCS dispute. 
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D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. REBALANCING STRATEGY 
The study of Indonesia’s and Thailand’s policy behaviors—in response to shifts 
in China’s policy toward Southeast Asia—has highlighted two key insights into how the 
United States should similarly adjust its rebalancing strategy to counterbalance China’s 
growing influence and to be a more effective strategic partner in the region.  
First, as part of the U.S. rebalancing strategy, it is vital for the United States to 
accord greater focus on strengthening economic ties with Indonesia and Thailand rather 
than just focusing on the military and security aspects of the rebalancing. The economic 
factor has been a key strategic calculus in influencing Indonesia’s and Thailand’s hedging 
preferences; therefore, any engagement strategy needs to involve the economic 
dimension as well. Some analysts such as Euan Graham have argued that the lack of an 
economic foundation and the over-reliance “on military levers to maintain its influence” 
have led to perceptions that the United States is unwilling to sustain its Asian strategic 
pivot beyond the short term, thus undermining the credibility and commitment of the U.S. 
rebalancing strategy.236 Furthermore, without the economic impetus in the U.S. 
rebalancing, Indonesia’s and Thailand’s increasing economic dependence on China may 
slowly pull these countries into China’s sphere of influence, which would be detrimental 
to the U.S. rebalancing interests. If Indonesia and Thailand perceive greater expectations 
of gains through bandwagoning with China and these perceptions are reinforced with 
doubts of the U.S. long-term commitments in the region, it increases the likelihood that 
the ruling elites would prioritize their relations with China over the United States.  
Although the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement has been Obama’s 
key economic policy for addressing the economic deficiency in the U.S. rebalancing 
strategy, it is important to note that Indonesia and Thailand have not expressed interest in 
joining the TPP negotiations for domestic reasons. The United States would need to look 
at deepening business and economic partnerships through other avenues to address the 
economic shortfall. With the relative decline of market shares of Thailand’s and 
Indonesia’s overall trade, the United States has lost its position as the top trading partner 
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of both countries to China. Indonesia and Thailand have already orientated their 
economic priorities toward China.  
Even if the argument is made that the United States is a larger investment partner 
than China in many Southeast Asian states like Indonesia, the relative investment gaps 
are rapidly closing. With Beijing’s proposed economic initiatives to increase investments 
in Southeast Asia, it would only be a matter of time before China catches up with the 
United States in terms of the size of investments. The United States would need to step 
up the economic pivot as part of its rebalancing strategy to deepen engagements with 
Southeast Asia in order to maintain its influence in the region. Otherwise, as Graham 
argues, the United States would have difficulty “enhancing its political leadership role in 
Southeast Asia” as “power factors are difficult to divorce from the economic policy 
realm.”237 
Second, the United States has to demonstrate its continued commitment as an ally 
and a reliable partner to reinforce mutual trust in U.S.-Thai and U.S.-Indonesian 
relations. With respect to Thailand, this demonstration of commitment is especially 
important given that the United States has downgraded its relations with Thailand over 
the military coup in 2014. Alienation of Prayuth’s government has already strained 
relations and created deeper mistrust of the United States as a reliable ally. Strained Thai-
U.S. relations have also paved the way for China to extend its influence over Thailand in 
the political, economic, and security realms. Although restoring full diplomatic relations 
and military assistance may only be possible when Thailand returns to being a 
democracy, it is important for the United States —in the interim—to reassure Thailand 
that it is continues to value the U.S-Thai relationship, and that it remains committed to 
Thailand as a security ally. This reassurance can be done in two ways. First, the United 
States has to ensure that military-to-military relations continue undisrupted, especially the 
annual conduct of Cobra Gold exercises. This key joint exercise has become the symbol 
of the close U.S.-Thai alliance over the years, and the cancellation of the exercise would 
signal to Prayuth’s government that the United States no longer values the U.S.-Thai 
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partnership. Second, the United States has to avoid further political posturing that would 
undermine the political legitimacy of the current Thai government. Prayuth has viewed 
Washington’s harsh criticisms over his handling of Thailand’s internal political and 
domestic affairs as unwarranted interferences to undermine his government. The United 
States has to recognize that Prayuth’s government needs domestic legitimacy in order to 
stabilize the country and conduct the necessary domestic political reforms to move 
toward democracy. As Thai analyst Kavi Chongkittavorn argues, continued U.S. political 
posturing would only “dampen any future amelioration of Thai-U.S. relations” and push 
Prayuth’s government to seek closer alignment with China in order to deliver the 
necessary political and economic reform.238  
With respect to Indonesia, Jokowi’s ambitious maritime vision has opened up a 
window of opportunity for the United States to consolidate the U.S.-Indonesia 
Comprehensive Partnership, strengthen mutual trust in the U.S.-Indonesia relations, and 
bolster the U.S. rebalancing strategy with the largest power in Southeast Asia. The United 
States can achieve these strategic objectives by assisting Indonesia’s maritime vision in 
three ways. First, under the ambit of the Comprehensive Partnership agreement, the 
United States can play a more proactive role in Indonesia’s military modernization by 
providing the military systems, training, and technical expertise to develop Indonesia’s 
maritime defense capabilities. In addition, the United States should also explore deeper 
defense cooperation in dealing with both non-traditional security issues and conventional 
threat scenarios. This would entail increasing joint exercises to enhance interoperability 
and mutual trust between the United States and Indonesian military. Second, the United 
States could do more to assist with building up Indonesia’s maritime infrastructure. With 
Indonesia seeking investments from friends in the region to develop its maritime 
economy, U.S. support in this area would pay long-term dividends in enhancing the U.S.-
Indonesia relations. Third, an important part of building up trust in the U.S.-Indonesia 
partnership is for the U.S. to support Indonesia’s interests in regional institutions and 
accommodate Indonesia’s rise in the region. As Sukma argues, Indonesia’s historical 
                                                 
238 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “US Political Posturing Kills Thai-US Relations,” Nation, July 20, 2015, 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/US-political-posturing-kills-Thai-US-relations-30264774.html. 
 102 
experience with extra-regional great powers has created nationalistic sentiments “that 
major powers will always try to reap unfair advantages at the expense of Indonesia’s own 
interests.”239 If both sides work together as equal partners, it is less likely that 
nationalism in Indonesia would become a divisive political issue with regards to Jakarta 
aligning more closely with the United States to maintain regional security and stability. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Although Indonesia and Thailand have shown different policy responses to 
China’s shift in policy posture, they have nonetheless continued to adopt a hedging 
strategy to cope with the strategic uncertainties of China’s rise and the evolving regional 
order. As long as China is not deemed an imminent security threat to Indonesia or 
Thailand, both countries will continue to adopt a hedging approach that seeks to 
minimize China as a potential long-term security threat while maximizing the short-term 
political and economic opportunities that are associated with China’s rise. As long as 
systemic conditions allow, Indonesia and Thailand will continue to adopt a hedging 
strategy because it provides their ruling elites with greater policy maneuvering space and 
the flexibility to align with the perceived winning side in the event of increased great 
power rivalry in the region. 
Under Jokowi’s government, Indonesia seems to have shifted closer to the 
balancing end of the hedging spectrum in its policy response toward China. However, 
given that he has only been in office for less than a year, it is still inconclusive as to 
whether Indonesia would lean toward the United States in its hedging preference. As 
Sukma has noted, “the sense of nationalism [in Indonesia] remains strong, and domestic 
politics have become more competitive in a more democratic context, taking sides or 
aligning itself too closely with any extra-regional great power carries a serious risk for 
the government, and becomes a divisive issue for domestic politics.”240 Unless China 
openly challenges Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Natuna waters and becomes an 
imminent security threat, it is unlikely that Indonesia would side with the United States to 
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balance against China’s rise. Instead, as a longer-term hedging strategy, Jokowi will 
likely abide by Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy by pursuing close relationships 
with China and the United States in order to maximize gains from both sides. However, 
any challenges to Indonesia’s sovereignty would likely provoke a nationalistic response 
to adopt a hedging preference leaning toward balancing in order to mitigate the potential 
risk of an escalating China threat.  
As for Thailand, although the current military-led government has strategically 
aligned itself closer to China, concerns of Thailand abandoning its hedging strategy and 
moving deeper into China’s sphere of influence may prove to be unfounded. Thailand’s 
diplomacy has often been characterized as “bending with the wind,” which seeks to 
manage great power relations in order to preserve Thailand’s political autonomy and 
sovereignty.241  In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Thailand had successfully 
managed its relations with the two major powers—China and the United States—and 
maximized economic and security benefits from both sides. In the past year, the military 
government has sought to diversify its hedging strategy by seeking strategic partnerships 
with other major powers in the region. Thailand’s actions indicate that it will continue to 
actively hedge in order to preserve the country’s political autonomy and avoid being 
embedded exclusively in China’s sphere of influence. Nevertheless, it is also unlikely that 
Thailand would go back to the status quo of maintaining an equidistant relationship 
between the two great powers even after Thai-U.S. relations are restored in the future; 
instead, it is more likely that Thailand’s hedging strategy toward China would continue to 
lean toward the bandwagoning end of the hedging spectrum so that it can maximize the 
economic and political benefits associated with China’s peaceful rise.   
In sum, Indonesia’s and Thailand’s current hedging preferences (under Jokowi’s 
and Prayuth’s governments) do not necessarily represent the long-term trends of their 
China foreign policy. The advantage of adopting a hedging strategy affords a country 
greater autonomy in policymaking and the ability to dynamically shift its hedging 
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preferences in accordance with how domestic factors affect the ruling elites’ perception 
of the evolving regional order and China as a great power. Ultimately, how Indonesia and 
Thailand will respond to future changes in China’s policy will depend on the ruling 
elite’s perception of benefits from an improved relation with China vis-à-vis the 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
“60 Years Indonesia-China Relations.” The Jakarta Post, April 13, 2010. 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/04/13/60-years-indonesiachina-
relations.html. 
Acharya, Amitav. “Seeking Security in the Dragon’s Shadow: China and Southeast Asia 
in the Emerging Asian Order.” RSIS Working Paper 44 (March 2003). 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP44.pdf. 
“Anger over Thailand’s Repatriation of Uighurs to China.” The National, July 9, 2015. 
http://www.thenational.ae/world/east-asia/anger-over-thailands-repatriation-of-
uighurs-to-china. 
Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. “An Indonesian Perspective on the U.S. Rebalancing Effort 
toward Asia.” The National Bureau of Asian Research 26 (2013). 
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=320. 
ASEAN Secretariat. “Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China on 
Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.” External Relations-China, 





“At the Double.” The Economist, March 15, 2014. 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21599046-chinas-fast-growing-defence-
budget-worries-its-neighbours-not-every-trend-its-favour. 
Beeson, Mark, and Fujian Li. “Charmed or Alarmed? Reading China’s Regional 
Relations.” Journal of Contemporary China 21, no.73 (2012): 35–51. doi: 
10.1080/10670564.2012.627664. 
Bentley, Scott. “Mapping the Nine-Dash Line: Recent Incidents Involving Indonesia in 
the South China Sea.” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 
Updated October 29, 2013. http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/mapping-the-nine-
dash-line-recent-incidents-involving-indonesia-in-the-south-china-sea/. 
Bower, Ernest. “Engagement in the Indo-Pacific: The Pentagon Leads by Example.” 
Southeast Asia from the Corner 4, no. 17 (2013). 
http://csis.org/publication/engagement-indo-pacific-pentagon-leads-example. 
 106 
Breckon, Lyall. “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Focus Is Elsewhere, but Bonds 
Continue to Grow.” Comparative Connections (April 2003). 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0301qchina_seasia.pdf. 
Browne, Andrew. “Chinese Premier Li Warns Southeast Asia Nations against 
‘Provocations.’” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2014. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230387360457949283244403161
4. 
Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. “Competing Diplomacies: Thailand Amidst Sino-American 
Rivalry.” Southeast Asian Affairs (2011): 306–19. doi: 10.1353/saa.2011.0006. 
———. “Leaning on Thailand’s Junta.” New York Times, June 30, 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/opinion/leaning-on-thailands-
junta.html?_r=0. 
Chang, Felix. “Comparative Southeast Asian Military Modernization—I,” ASAN Forum: 
An Online Journal 3, no. 3 (2015). http://www.theasanforum.org/comparative-
southeast-asian-military-modernization-1/. 
Chang, Wanquan. “Thailand: Thailand-China to Expand Comprehensive Cooperation in 
Security.” Asia News Monitor, February 10, 2015. Proquest ID: 1652372927. 
Chen, Ian Tsung-Yen, and Alan Hao Yang. “A Harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory 
Typologies to ASEAN Countries’ Strategies to the Rise of China.” The Pacific 
Review 26, no. 3 (2013): 265–88. doi: 10.1080/09512748.2012.759260. 
“China, Indonesia Pledge Closer Strategic Partnership.” Xinhua, March 26, 2015. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/26/c_134100693.htm. 
“China Supports ‘Dual-Track’ Approach to Resolve South China Sea Issue: Chinese 
FM.” Xinhua, August 10, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-
08/10/c_133544827.htm. 
“China, Thailand Upgrade Bilateral Ties, Vow Closer Trade Links.” Xinhua, April 18, 
2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-04/18/c_131533612.htm. 
“China’s Peaceful Development.” People’s Republic of China White Paper, September 6, 
2011. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm. 
“China’s Military Strategy.” The State Council Information Office of the People’s 
Republic of China, May 26, 2015. http://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-
chinas-military-strategy. 
“Chinese, Indonesian Presidents Pledge Strategic Partnership.” Want China Times, 
October 3, 2013. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-
cnt.aspx?id=20131003000132&cid=1101. 
 107 
Chinwanno, Chulacheeb. “Rising China and Thailand’s Policy of Strategic Engagement.” 
In The Rise of China: Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan, edited by J. 
Tsunekawa. NIDS Joint Research Series No. 4, 81–109. Tokyo: The National 
Institute for Defense Studies, 2009.  
———. Thai-Chinese Relations: Security and Strategic Partnership. RSIS Working 
Paper No. 155 (24 March 2008). http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-
pubs/WP155.pdf. 
Chongkittavorn, Kavi. “US Political Posturing Kills Thai-US Relations,” The Nation, 
July 20, 2015. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/US-political-posturing-
kills-Thai-US-relations-30264774.html. 
———. “Surge in Sino-Thai Security Cooperation.” The Nation, February 9, 2015. 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Surge-in-Sino-Thai-security-
cooperation-30253669.html. 
———. “Thailand as a Pivotal Chinese Partner.” The Nation, April 17, 2012. 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Thailand-as-a-pivotal-Chinese-
partner-30180018.html. 
———. “Thailand Looks Beyond the U.S. Alliance.” The Nation, April 17, 2012. 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Thailand-looks-beyond-the-US-
alliance-30179152.html. 
Chung, Jae Ho. “East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations.” 
Pacific Affairs 82, no. 4 (2009/2010): 657–75. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25608969. 
Connelly, Aaron L. “Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo’s Foreign Policy 
Challenges.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 37, no. 1 (2015): 1–28. doi: 
10.1355/cs37-1a. 
Dai, Bingguo. “Stick to the Path of Peaceful Development.” Xinhua, December 13, 2010. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-12/13/c_13646586_2.htm. 
Emmerson, Donald K. “China’s ‘Frown Diplomacy’ in Southeast Asia.” Asia Times, 
October 5, 2010. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LJ05Ad02.html. 
Feng, Zhongping, and Jing Huang, “China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Engaging 
with a Changing World.” ESPO Working Paper no. 9 (2014). 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/WP-ESPO-8-JUNE-
2014.pdf. 




Fravel, M. Taylor. “China Views India’s Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing 
Differences.” In Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers, 
edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough, 65–100. 
Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011. 
Fullbrook, David. “Thailand in China’s Embrace.” Asia Times Online, April 9, 2004. 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FD09Ae04.html. 
“Full Text: China’s National Defense in 2010.” Xinhua, March 31, 2011. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm. 
Fung, Esther. “Chinese Companies Invest $10 Billion in Indonesia.” Marketwatch, April 
30, 2011. http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinese-companies-invest-10-
billion-in-indonesia-2011-04-30. 
Ganjanakhundee, Supalak, and Pravit Rojanaphruk. “Dalai Lama’s Sister Denied Visa.” 
The Nation, March 4, 2010. 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/03/04/national/Dalai-Lamas-sister-
denied-visa-30123902.html. 
Gindarsah, Lis, and Adhi Priamarizki. “Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security 
Concerns.” RSIS Publications, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 
(RSIS-NTU), April 9, 2015. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/idss/indonesias-maritime-doctrine-and-security-concerns/. 
Glaser, Bonnie S. Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission. 
“China’s Relations with Southeast Asia.” May 13, 2015. 
http://csis.org/testimony/security-dimensions-chinas-relations-southeast-asia-0. 
Glaser, Bonnie S., and Evan S Medeiros. “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-
Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of ‘Peaceful Rise.’” 
The China Quarterly 190 (2007): 291–310. doi: 10.1017/S0305741007001208. 
Glosny, Michael A. “Heading toward a Win-Win Future? Recent Developments in 
China’s Policy toward Southeast Asia.” Asian Security 2, no. 1 (2007): 24–57. 
doi: 10.1080/14799850600575199. 
Goh, Evelyn. “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing 
Regional Security Strategies.” International Security 32, no. 3 (2007/08): 113–57. 
doi: 10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.113. 
———. “Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security 
Strategies.” Policy Studies 16 (2005): 1–82. 
http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/handle/10125/3509. 
 109 
———. “Southeast Asia Responses to China’s Rise: Managing the ‘Elephants?’” In The 
Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond, edited by 
Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato, 159–77. London: Routledge, 2009. 
———. “Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge.” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 30, nos. 4–5 (2007): 809–32. doi: 10.1080/01402390701431915. 
Graham, Euan. “Southeast Asia in the U.S. Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided 
Region.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic 
Affairs 35, no. 3 (2013): 305–32. doi: 10.1353/csa.2013.0022. 
Hadi, Syamsul. “Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Rise of China: Indonesia in the Midst of 
East Asia’s Dynamics in the Post-Global Crisis World.” International Journal of 
China Studies 3, no. 2 (2012): 151–66. 
http://ics.um.edu.my/images/ics/IJCSV3N2/contribnotes.pdf. 
Heath, Timothy R. “Diplomacy Work Forum: Xi Steps Up Efforts to Shape a China-
Centered Regional Order.” In China Brief 13, no.22 (2013): 6. 
http://www.jamestown.org/chinabrief/. 
Hiep, Le Hong. “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization.” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 
35, no. 3 (2013): 333–68. doi: 10.1353/csa.2013.0024. 
Hu, Jintao. “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Speech at BFA Annual Conference 2004.” Xinhua, 
April 24, 2004. http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/93897.htm. 
———. “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress.” Xinhua, October 24, 
2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749_10.htm. 
“‘If I were a Woman I will Fall in Love with his Excellency’: Thai General Admits Man 
Crush on China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi.” South China Morning Post, August 
7, 2015. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/diplomacy/article/1847007/if-i-were-
woman-i-will-fall-love-his-excellency-thai-general. 
International Crisis Group. “Stirring Up the South China Sea (III): A Fleeting 
Opportunity for Calm.” Asia Report 267 (2015). 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/267-stirring-up-the-
south-china-sea-iii-a-fleeting-opportunity-for-calm. 
Jikkham, Patsara, and Wassana Nanuam, “Thailand, China Deepen Defense Ties.” 




Johnson, Christopher K. Decoding China’s Emerging ‘Great Power’ Strategy in Asia. 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2014. 
http://www.spf.org/media/upload/1_CSIS.pdf.  
———. Thoughts from the Chairman: Xi Jinping Unveils His Foreign Policy Vision. 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 2014. 
http://csis.org/publication/thoughts-chairman-xi-jinping-unveils-his-foreign-
policy-vision. 
“Joint Statement of the Kingdom of Thailand and the People’s Republic of China on a 
Plan of Action for the 21st Century.” Thailand-China Business Link, 
Kasikornthai. Accessed July 4, 2015. http://www.thailand-
china.com/ThaiandChinaLinks/BilateralAgreements.aspx?lang=en-GB. 
Kapoor, Kanupriya, and Linda Sieg. “Joko Says China Has No Legal Claim to South 
China Sea.” Jakarta Globe, March 23, 2015. 
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/joko-says-china-no-legal-claim-south-
china-sea/. 
Kapoor, Kanupriya, and Randy Fabi. “Indonesia Eyes Regular Navy Exercises with U.S. 
in South China Sea.” Reuters, April 13, 2015. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/13/us-indonesia-us-southchinasea-
idUSKBN0N40O320150413. 
Keller, Greta. “Growing Convergence, Greater Consequence: The Strategic Implications 
of Close Indonesia-China Relations.” Security Challenges 7, no. 3 (2011): 23–41. 
http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol7no3Nabbs-Keller.pdf. 
Kerry, John. “Remarks with Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa before Their 
Meeting.” U.S. Department of State. Updated May 16, 2013. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/05/209509.htm. 
Khong, Yuen Foong. “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and 
Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia’s Post-Cold War Strategy.” In Rethinking 
Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, edited by J. J. Suh, Peter 
Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, 172–208. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2004. 
Kislenko, Arne. “Bending with the Wind: The Continuity and Flexibility of Thai Foreign 
Policy.” International Journal 57, no. 4 (2002): 537–61. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40203691. 
Kosandi, Meidi. “Shifting Paradigms and Dynamics of Indonesia-China Relations: 
Toward the Best Use of Theoretical Eclecticism.” Asian Politics & Policy 5, no. 2 
(2013): 183–210. doi: 10.1111/aspp.12029. 
 111 
Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. “Making Sense of Malaysia’s China Policy: Asymmetry, 
Proximity, and Elite’s Domestic Authority.” The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics 6 (2013): 429–67. doi: 10.1093/cjip/pot006. 
———. “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising 
China.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic 
Affairs 30, no. 2 (2008): 159–85. doi: 10.1353/csa.0.0023. 
Kuik, Cheng-Chwee, Nor Azizan Idris, and Abd Rahim Md Nor. “The China Factor in 
the U.S. ‘Reengagement’ with Southeast Asia: Drivers and Limits of Converged 
Hedging.” Asian Politics and Policy 4, no. 3 (2012): 315–44. doi: 10.111/j.1943-
0787.2012.01361.x. 
Laksmana, Evan. “Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really 
Matter?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 2 (2011): 157–82. doi: 
10.1355/cs33-2a. 
———. “Variations on a Theme: Dimensions of Ambivalence in Indonesia-China 
Relations.” Harvard Asia Quarterly 13, no. 1 (2011): 24–31. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979863. 
Leifer, Michael. “Indonesia’s Encounters with China and the Dilemmas of Engagement.” 
In Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, edited by Alastair 
Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, 87–108. New York: Routledge, 1999. 
Li, Chenyang. “China-Myanmar Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership: A 
Regional Threat?” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 1 (2012): 
53–72. http://www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org. 
Li, Keqiang. “Take China-ASEAN Relations to New Height.” Full Text of Li Keqiang 
Remarks at 17th ASEAN-China Summit, November 13, 2014. 
http://english.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/11/15/content_281475010415762.ht
m. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Remarks by His 
Excellency Wen Jiabao Premier of the People’s Republic of China at China-
Indonesia Strategic Dialogue.” Updated April 30, 2011. 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/wenzonglifangwenmlxyheidnx
y_665760/t820936.shtml. 
Moeldoko. “China’s Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea.” The Wall Street 
Journal, April 24, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles 
/SB10001424052702304279904579515692835172248. 
Murphy, Ann Marie. “Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning: Thailand’s Response to 
China’s Rise.” Asian Security 6, no. 1 (2010): 1–27. doi: 
10.1080/14799850903471922. 
 112 
———. “Indonesia’s Partnership with the United States: Strategic Imperatives versus 
Domestic Obstacles.” In Strategic Asia 2014–15: U.S. Alliances and 
Partnerships: At the Center of Global Power, 197–226. Washington, DC: 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011. 
Novotny, Daniel. Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian 
Foreign Policy. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010. 
Pape, Robert. “Soft Balancing against the United States.” International Security 30, no. 1 
(2005): 7–45. doi: 10.1162/0162288054894607. 
Parameswaran, Prashanth. “China and Indonesia under Jokowi: Show Me the Money.” 
The Diplomat, January 28, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/china-and-
indonesia-under-jokowi-show-me-the-money/. 
Pellerin, Cheryl. “Hagel Announces U.S. Deal to Sell Helicopters to Indonesia.” DOD 
News, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed July 4, 2015. 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120674. 
Prasirtsuk, Kitti. “The Implications of U.S. Strategic Rebalancing: A Perspective from 
Thailand.” Asia Policy 15 (2013): 31–37. doi: 10.1353/asp.2013.0013. 
“Premier Li Keqiang Attends the 16th ASEAN-China Summit, Stressing to Push for 
Wide-Ranging, In-Depth, High-Level, All-Dimensional Cooperation between 
China and ASEAN and Continue to Write New Chapter of Bilateral Relations.” 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 10, 2013. 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/lkqzlcxdyldrxlhy_665684/t108
8098.shtml. 
“Premier Wen Attends ASEAN Plus Three Summit, Makes 5-Point Proposal.” Xinhua, 
November 20, 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-
11/20/content_7116428.htm. 
“President Xi Gives Speech to Indonesia’s Parliament.” China Daily, October 2, 2013. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xiapec/2013-
10/02/content_17007915.htm. 
Qin, Yaqing. “Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China’s 
International Strategy.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2014): 
285–314. doi: 10.1093/cjip/pou034. 
Roy, Denny. “China’s Grand Strategy Is Not Absent, Just Contradictory.” Asia Pacific 
Bulletin 292 (2014). http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications 
/china%E2%80%99s-grand-strategy-not-absent-just-contradictory. 
 113 
———. “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 27, no. 2 (2005): 
305–22. DOI: 10.1353/csa.2011.0115. 
Schiavenza, Matt. “Why Thailand Forced Uighurs to Return to China.” The Atlantic, July 
12, 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/07/thailand-
china-uighur-refugees/398318/. 
Schweller, Randall. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” 
International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72–107. doi: 10.2307/2539149. 
———. “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory.” In Engaging China: 
The Management of an Emerging Power, edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and 
Robert S. Ross, 1–31. London, NY: Routledge, 1999. 
Shambaugh, David. “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order.” International 
Security 29, no. 3 (2004/05): 72–89. 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288043467496. 
Simon, Sheldon. “US-Southeast Asia Relations: South China Sea Wariness.” 
Comparative Connections 17, no. 1 (May 2015). 
http://csis.org/files/publication/1501qus_seasia.pdf. 
Storey, Ian. “A Hiatus in the Sino-Thai ‘Special Relationship.’” In China Brief 6, no. 19 
(2006). http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/archivescb/cb2006/. 
———. “China and Indonesia: Military-Security Ties Fail to Gain Momentum.” China 
Brief 9, no. 4 (2009): 6–8. http://www.chinabrief.org. 
———. “China’s Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia.” Asian Security 8, no. 
3 (2012): 287–310. doi: 10.1080/14799855.2012.723928. 
———. “From Strength to Strength: Military Exercises Bolster Sino-Thai Relations.” 
China Brief 12, no. 12 (2012): 9–12. 
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_06_03.pdf. 
———. Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The Search for Security. London: 
Routledge, 2011. 
Sukma, Rizal. Indonesia and China: The Politics of Troubled Relationship. London: 
Routledge, 1999. 
———. “Indonesia and the Emerging Sino-US Rivalry in Southeast Asia.” In The New 
Geopolitics of Southeast Asia, edited by Nicholas Kitchen, 42–46. London, UK: 
LSE IDEAS, 2013. http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications 
/reports/SR015.aspx. 
 114 
———. “Indonesia-China Relations: The Politics of Re-engagement.” Asian Survey 49, 
no. 4 (2009): 591–608. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2009.49.4.591. 
———. “Indonesia’s Response to the Rise of China: Growing Comfort Amid 
Uncertainties.” In The Rise of China: Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan, 
edited by J. Tsunekawa, 139–55. Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense 
Studies, 2009. 
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series4/pdf/4-5.pdf. 
Sutter, Robert. Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, 3rd ed. 
Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2012. 
Sutter, Robert, and Chin-Hao Huang. “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Beijing Sets 
Positive Agenda, Plays Down Disputes.” Comparative connections 16, no. 3 
(January 2015). http://csis.org/files/publication/1403qchina_seasia.pdf. 
———. “China-Southeast Asia Relations: China’s Toughness on the South China Sea-
Year II.” Comparative connections 15, no. 2 (September 2013). 
http://csis.org/files/publication/1302qchina_seasia.pdf. 
———. “China-Southeast Asia Relations: China Reassures Neighbors, Deepens 
Engagement.” Comparative connections 13, no. 1 (May 2011). 
http://csis.org/files/publication/1101qchina_seasia.pdf. 
———. “China-Southeast Asia Relations: China’s Growing Resolve in the South China 
Sea.” Comparative connections 15, no. 1 (May 2013). 
http://csis.org/files/publication/1301qchina_seasia.pdf. 
Swaine, Michael D. “Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy.” China 
Leadership Monitor 44 (2014): 1–43. http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files 
/research/docs/clm44ms.pdf. 
Swaine, Michael D., and M. Taylor Fravel. “China’s Assertive Behavior—Part Two: The 
Maritime Periphery.” China Leadership Monitor 35 (2011): 1–29. 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM35MS.pdf. 
Takenaka, Kiyoshi. “Philippines’s Aquino Revives Comparison between China and Nazi 
Germany.” Reuters, June 3, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/03/us-
japan-philippines-idUSKBN0OJ0OY20150603. 
Tessman, Brock F. “System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu.” 
Security Studies 21, no. 2 (2012): 192–231. doi: 10.1080/09636412.2012.679203. 
“Thailand/United States: Joint Statement between President Barack Obama and Prime 
Minister Yingluck Shinawatra.” Asia News Monitor, November 19, 2012. 
ProQuest: 1170559996. 
 115 
“Thailand Eyes Increased Bilateral Cooperation with China.” Asia Briefing, January 12, 
2015. http://www.asiabriefing.com/news/2015/01/thailand-eyes-increased-
bilateral-cooperation-china/. 
“Thai PM Say China Pledges to Buy 1 Million Tonnes of Rice a Year.” Chicago Tribune, 
October 13, 2013. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-10-13/news/sns-rt-
china-thailandrice-20131013_1_thai-pm-unmilled-rice-translates-thai-rice-
exporters-association. 
Thayer, Carlyle. “ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.” SAIS 
Review 33, no. 2 (2013): 75–84. doi: 10.1353/sais.2013.0022. 
Tjhin, Christine Susanna. “Indonesia’s Perceptions of the ‘China Threat’: From ‘Yellow 
Threat from the North’ to ‘Strategic Partner.’” In China’s Rise—Threat or 
Opportunity, edited by Herbert Yee, 191–211. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
———. “Indonesia’s Relations with China: Productive and Pragmatic, but Not Yet a 
Strategic Partnership.” China Report 48, no. 3 (2012): 303–15. doi: 
10.1177/0009445512462303. 
Valente, Catherine. “PNoy Likens China’s Rulers to Hitler for Claiming Disputed 
Territories.” The Manila Times, February 5, 2014. 
http://www.manilatimes.net/pnoy-likens-chinas-rulers-to-hitler-for-claiming-
disputed-territories/73470/. 
Walt, Stephen M. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power.” International Security 
9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538540. 
Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010. 
Wen, Jiabao. “Full Text of Premier Wen Jiabao’s Speech at China-ASEAN Summit.” 
October 31, 2006. http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t278097.htm. 
Xi, Jinping. “Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in 
Neighboring Countries.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China, October 25, 2013. 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t
1093870.shtml. 
———. “The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Was Held in 
Beijing.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
November 29, 2014. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng 
/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml. 
———. “Working Together for a Better Future for Asia and the World.” Full Text of the 
Keynote Speech, Boao Forum for Asia, April 7, 2013. 
http://english.boaoforum.org/mtzxxwzxen/7379.jhtml. 
 116 
Yan, Xuetong. “China’s New Foreign Policy: Not Conflict but Convergence of Interests.” 
Huffington Post, January 28, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yan-
xuetong/chinas-new-foreign-policy_b_4679425.html. 
———. “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement.” The China Journal 
of International Politics (2014): 153–84. doi: 10.1093/cjip/pou027. 
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang. “SBY’s Inaugural Speech: The Text.” Jakarta Globe, 
October 20, 2009. http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/sbys-inaugural-
speech-the-text/. 
Yulisman, Linda. “Chinese Investors Encouraged to Realize RI Investment Plans.” The 
Jakarta Post, January 21, 2015. 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/21/chinese-investors-encouraged-
realize-ri-investment-plans.html. 
Wardah, Fatiyah. “US, Indonesia Expand Military Cooperation Agreement.” Voice of 
America, January 7, 2015. http://www.voanews.com/content/us-indonesia-
expand-military-cooperation-agreement/2589473.html. 
Wardhi, Robertus, and Primus Dorimulu. “Jokowi, Xi Push Bilateral Relations Forward 
at APEC Meeting.” Jakarta Globe, November 10, 2014. 
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/jokowi-xi-push-bilateral-relations-
forward-apec-meeting/. 
Wijaya, Indra. “Indonesia to Build Military Base in Natuna.” Tempo English Online, 
September 10, 2014. http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/09/10/055605767 
/Indonesia-to-Build-Military-Base-in-Natuna. 
Witular, Rendi A. “Jokowi Launches Maritime Doctrine to the World.” Jakarta Post, 
November 13, 2014. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-
launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html. 
———. “Presenting the Maritime Doctrine.” The Jakarta Post, November 14, 2014. 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/14/presenting-maritime-
doctrine.html. 
Wu, Jiao. “President Xi Gives Speech to Indonesia’s Parliament.” China Daily, October 
2, 2013. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xiapec/2013-
10/02/content_17007915.htm. 
“Xi’s Indonesia Visit Lifts Bilateral Ties, Charts Future Cooperation.” Xinhua, October 
3, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/03/c_132770995.htm. 
Xie, Huanchi. “China, Indonesia Vow to Further Deepen Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership.” Xinhua, April 22, 2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-
04/22/c_134175211.htm. 
 117 
Zhang, Jian. “China’s New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: Towards ‘Peaceful Rise 
2.0’?” Global Change, Peace & Security: Formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, 
Security & Global Change 27, no. 1 (2015): 5–19. doi: 
10.1080/14781158.2015.993958.  
 118 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
 119 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
